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Forest L. Grieves

Since World War II the United States and Mexico have established
friendly relations based on mutual economic interests, but marred
by old resentments and long-standing problems.
The purpose of this
thesis is to examine the current state of relations between the
United States and Mexico.
The scope of the thesis covers the years
1976 to the present, a period in which oil surfaced as a signifi-^
cant factor in U. S. - Mexican affairs.
The study focuses on the
role of economics in cementing a stormy friendship, specifically
looking at the issues of trade, oil, and immigration.
The century following Mexico's independence was a period of
hostility in which the United States dominated Mexico. Mexico
lost the territories of Texas, California, and New Mexico to the
United States through annexation and war, and suffered loss of
economic sovereignty to U. S. business interests.
The resentment
caused by these events continues to influence relations.
Common economic interests have pulled the United States and
Mexico into a more friendly relationship, with the United States,
however, continuing to dominate.
Mexico is a valuable trading
partner for the United States, but accounts for only a small
percentage of U . S . imports and exports while the United States
accounts for over half of Mexico's import-export trade.
Immigra
tion provides a similar situation with the U . S . relying on Mexico
for inexpensive labor, but not to the extent that Mexico counts on
immigration as a safety valve for its unemployment problem.
Oil is
the one area in which the two economies are more truly interdepend
ent: Mexico sells the preponderance of its oil to the U. S. while
U. S. banks hold the preponderance of Mexico's oil debt.
Economics binds the United States to Mexico, but the continual
contact involved creates day-to-day problems such as differences
over restrictions on tomato exports.
Such details can be worked
out relatively quickly, but there are more basic differences.
The
U. S. promotes free trade while Mexico practices protection of its
industry.
In immigration the U. S. attempts to enforce ceilings,
but Mexico allows unrestricted emigration.
The resulting controversies create an image of tension obscuring
the fact that the U. S. and Mexico continue to work together peace
fully.
Relations continue to be basically cordial because it is to
both country's economic advantage to remain friendly.
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INTRODUCTION

United States ties with Mexico are strong.

To quote Henry Kissinger,

"The imperatives of the relationship of Mexico and the United States are
not to be found in words, but in geography.

Our shared destiny is

literally written in stone."'''
Mexico is important to the United States as a source of oil, as a
source of trade, and as the homeland of nearly nine million Americans.

In

1976, with its discovery of major new oil fields, Mexico became important
to the U. S. as a close and stable supply of oil providing an alternative
to reliance on Middle Eastern supplies.

U. S. - Mexican trade in imports

and exports has grown until Mexico is the United States’ third largest
trading partner.

Each year, in addition to legal immigrants, 500,000 to

800,000 undocumented Mexican workers come to the United States.
the major issues confronting the United States and Mexico.

These are

Problems of

lesser magnitude include drug control, water quality, and pollution.
Because Mexico has such an impact on the United States it is important to
be aware of the problems facing the two nations.
The goal of this thesis is to provide readers who have little
background in U. S. - Mexican affairs with a knowledge of U. S. - Mexican
history and of the prominent issues that currently concern the two
countries.

Chapter I will examine how events of the past influence the

present relationship with Mexico.

The remaining chapters will provide a

fairly detailed account of three areas of major importance in the U. S. 1

2
Mexican relationship: trade, oil, and immigration.

These chapters will

begin with the Carter - Lopez Portillo presidencies in 1976, a date which
coincides with Mexico’s new oil discoveries.
It is the thesis of this paper that:

(1) relations between the United

States and Mexico are generally friendly, although persistent problems over
trade, oil, and immigration often give the appearance of a quarrelsome,
troubled relationship; and (2) economics is basic to the U. S. - Mexican
relationship.

Trade, oil, and immigration are all issues rooted in

economics.
Themes rising out of U. S. - Mexican history can be traced through
the controversies involving trade and oil.

It will be seen that the

United States has dominated Mexico since its independence in 1821, first
in territorial matters and then in economic areas.

While the United

States has exerted great influence over Mexico's development, Mexico
remains of secondary importance to the United States.

Particularly since

World War II, American attention has shifted from Mexico to East - West
concerns.

Mexican resentment of U. S. dominance, however, still influences

events today.

Footnotes

^"Toast by Secretary Kissinger, Mexico City, June 11," Department
of State Bulletin, July 5, 1976, p. 33.
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I.

HISTORY

Mexican War
Relations between the United States and Mexico from the 1940's into
the 1970's were cordial.

However, for most of the preceding century the

history of the two nations was marred by suspicion and hostility.

From

the time of the Texas Revolution in 1836 to the expropriation of oil lands
in 1938, the United States and Mexico were involved in a number of serious
and, at times, violent disputes.

During those times, Mexicans feared that

the United States, with its wealth and power, was intent on gaining control
of their country.

While early conflicts were over boundary lines, by the

late nineteenth century business and property rights were at the center of
the disagreements.
Though the hostilities of the century following Mexico's indepen
dence created distrust on both sides of the border, the period is better
remembered in Mexico.

Mexican affairs no longer dominate the U. S.

horizon, and old antagonisms are mostly forgotten.

To Mexico, however,

the extent of U. S. influence is still a concern, and the past is not so
easily dismissed.
At the time of Mexico's independence in 1821, the United States had
already expanded beyond the Mississippi.

Mexico's first president,

Guadalupe Victoria, made suspicious of American intentions by talk that
the boundary with Mexico was not the Sabine River (as the 1821 treaty with
Spain specified) but possibly the Rio Grande, characterized the citizens
4

5
of the United States as ambitious people, without a spark of good faith,
always ready to encroach upon adjacent territory**'
Nonetheless, Mexico allowed United States citizens led by Stephen
Austin to settle in Texas.

The hope was that the immigrants would be

peacefully integrated, but political, religious and cultural differences
hindered assimilation.

The U. S. immigrants, numbering 30,000 by 1835,

were alarmed when President Santa Anna annulled the 1824 Constitution and
began centralizing the government, depriving them of control over local
affairs.

Texas rebelled and declared its independence on March 2, 1836.

One month later, the Texas Revolution ended with the defeat of the Mexican
army near the San Jacinto River.

Texas then established the Lone Star

Republic and remained independent for nine years from 1836 to 1845.

During

this time Mexico refused to recognize the Republic, but was unable to force
Texas back into its fold.
Expansionists in the United States would have annexed Texas, but,
partly out of fear of provoking a war with Mexico and partly because of
entanglement in the slavery issue, annexation was delayed until 1845.
Spurred by the election of James K. Polk, who had run on a platform
including annexation, the Congress finally passed an annexation resolution
in February, 1845.

Upon passage of the resolution, the Mexican minister

in Washington immediately lodged a protest and departed for Mexico.
Within a month, his American counterpart had returned to Washington and
the two nations were preparing for war.

2

Attempts to negotiate a settlement to the annexation dispute focused
on the western boundary of Texas.
since colonial times.

The Nueces River had been the border

When Moses Austin was granted his concession to

6
settle Texas, the boundary was the Nueces River; again, when the grant was
extended to Stephen Austin, the boundary was the Nueces River.

Yet, Texas

claimed the Rio Grande as the western boundary on these grounds: first,
some U. S. immigrants had been allowed to settle between the Nueces and
the Rio Grande; and second, after his defeat at San Jacinto, Santa Anna
had ordered his troops back across the Rio Grande, not the Nueces.
If Texas was successful in this claim, the new boundary would add
not only the 150 miles between the Rio Grande and Nueces, but also half of
New Mexico and Colorado.

When Texas entered the Union, Polk decided to

support the Texas claim to the Rio Grande boundary.

He sent an envoy, John

Slidell, to Mexico City to discuss the claim with Mexico's President Herrera.
In addition, Slidell was instructed to negotiate the purchase of California
and the remainder of New Mexico.

Indignant protests in the Mexican press,

and threats to overthrow Herrera if he acceded to the American demands, led
3

to the termination of the Slidell mission.
Shortly after Slidell returned to Washington, hostilities began.
President Polk had ordered General Zachary Taylor's troops into the dis
puted territory between the Nueces and the Rio Grande.

Taylor ignored a

Mexican order to withdraw, and instead advanced all the way to the Rio
Grande.

He was involved in a skirmish in which sixteen of his men were

killed or wounded.
with Mexico.

This gave Polk the excuse he needed to pursue a war

He went to the Congress with the message, "...after reiterat

ed menaces, Mexico has passed the boundary of the United States, has
invaded our territory, and shed American blood on American soil.

She has

proclaimed that hostilities exist, and that the two nations are now at
4
war."

This view differed substantially from Mexico's.

From the Mexican

7
side of the Nueces, it appeared that the Americans had taken Texas,
changed the boundary to double its size, and, when Mexico resisted this
5

action, accused Mexico of invading the United States.
The Mexican War began in 1846 and ended with the Treaty of Guadalupe
Hidalgo signed on February 2, 1848.

Although hard-fought battles partially

saved Mexican honor, the U. S. armies eventually captured Mexico City.
Mexico paid dearly for the war.

The treaty ceded to the United States all

Mexican territory north and west of the Rio Grande.

This included Texas,

the California territory, and the New Mexico territory.

In return the

United States paid Mexico $15,000,000 and assumed the claims of U. S.
citizens against the Mexican government.
The Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo basically established the U. S. Mexican border as it exists today.

The only subsequent major changes

came in the Gadsden Purchase in 1854.

Badly in need of funds, Santa Anna

agreed to sell the Mesilla Valley (today southern New Mexico and Arizona)
for $10,000,000.
The Texas Revolution and the Mexican War produced long-lasting
distrust and hostility between the United States and Mexico.

Two incidents

of the Texas Revolution combined to crystalize U. S. opposition to Mexico:
the deaths, to the last man, of a Texas force at the famous battle of the
Alamo; and Santa Anna's order to execute 365 Texas prisoners of war as
pirates.

6

The War also created martyrs for Mexico.

In a major offensive at

Veracruz, General Winfield Scott laid siege to the city, denying all
pleas to allow women, children, and noncombatants to evacuate.
the heroes of the war were the Boy Heroes of Chapultepec.

However,

The cadets of

Chapultepec Castle were reportedly the last defenders of Mexico City

before its fall ended the war.

Many of the cadets died rather than

surrender.
The Mexican War strengthened the stereotypes that the United States
and Mexico held about each other.

American historians subsequently wrote

of the U. S. duty to regenerate a backward people and fulfill Manifest
0
Desitny.

Devastated and humiliated by the loss of half their territory,

Mexicans became more hostile than ever to the United States.

Fears and

hatred of the United States ran deep and were reflected in folk songs of .
the period.

The intellectual community's criticism of U. S. imperialism

added respectability to the prevailing Yankeephobia.^

Lincoln through Diaz - Growing Ties
Relations between the United States and Mexico began to improve under
Presidents Abraham Lincoln and Benito Juarez.

When Juarez was deposed by

the French and replaced by Archduke Maximillian of Hapsburg, the United
States continued to recognize Juarez' exiled republican government.

8

The

French occupation of Mexico ended in February, 1867, and by May the Second
Mexican Empire had fallen to the republicans.
Mexico City.

Benito Juarez returned to

9

The Liberal government was restored for a short time.

Then in 1876,

Porfirio Diaz overthrew Juarez' successor, President Sebastian Lerdo de
Tejada, and established himself as President.

For the next third of a

century, Diaz controlled Mexico’s destiny.
The United States refused to recognize Porfirio Diaz pending the
resolution of several problems between the two nations.
settlement of U. S. claims against Mexico.

The first was the

This problem was quickly solved,

and Mexico began making payments in January, 1877.

More serious was the

question of border raids.

Groups of Indians and bandits from Mexico were

crossing the border, attacking U. S. settlements and driving cattle herds
back into Mexico.

Diaz refused to accept any responsibility for preventing

the thefts.^
Continued border violations combined with the American policy of
pursuing the raiders into Mexico nearly brought the two countries to war
by the summer of 1877.

Tensions began to subside when President Diaz

finally ordered additional troops to guard the frontier.

The United States,

at last convinced that the Diaz administration intended to establish order
and meet its foreign obligations, recognized Diaz in May, 1 8 7 8 , ^

Spurred

by growing economic ties, relations continued to improve for the remainder
of the Diaz era.
Diaz believed sound economic health was the answer to Mexico's
domestic problems.

Since there was little available capital in Mexico,

foreign investment was encouraged.
a modern economy was in place.

Within a generation, the framework of

With the help of U. S. and British capital,

Mexico built railroads, banks, heavy industry, a sound currency, and
established excellent credit abroad.

12

Although official relations between the United States and Mexico
improved steadily after the Mexican War, the Mexican poeple continued to
distrust U. S. influence.

Labor and the church both objected to foreign

"colonization" by which U. S. investment in Mexico exceeded the investments
of the Mexicans themselves.

The American economic invasion was seen as a

threat to Mexico's national interests.

The U. S. Role in the Mexican Revolution
Capital improvements made during the Diaz era did not improve

10
conditions for the masses of Mexico.
foreigners and the upper classes.

The new wealth benefitted only

Foreigners, in control of business and

large amounts of agricultural land, were given preferred treatment by the
police courts.

Opposition to Diaz grew.

In the Revolution that followed,

the United States under President Woodrow Wilson intervened several times.
Political opposition to Diaz began when he announced that he would
not be a candidate in the 1910 election.

Diaz soon changed his mind,

however, and had his opponent, Francisco I. Madero, jailed.

On his release,

Madero fled to the United States where he issued a plan of revolution call
ing for land reform, social justice, and a single-term presidency.
six months the government had fallen.
sailed for Europe.

Within

Diaz resigned on May 25, 1911, and

Madero was elected President that fall.

13

President William Howard Taft quickly recognized Madero's government,
but Madero was soon challenged by impatient social reformers within
Mexico.

In the space of a year five rebellions against him broke out.

The Madero government was overthrown by a military coup led by
Bernardo Reyes and Felix Diaz.

For nine days neither the rebels nor the

government troops could gain a clear advantage.

Then General Victoriano

Huerta, Madero's commanding general, switched sides.

Huerta ordered one

of his generals to arrest the president, his brother and most of his
cab i n e t.^
U. S. Ambassador Henry Lane Wilson mediated between Madero and
Huerta in the hope of reestablishing a peace that would guard the safety
of U . S .

citizens and business interests.

mediator, however.

Wilson was not an impartial

Earlier, he had demanded that Madero resign and

informed Huerta's representatives that the United States would recognize
any regime that could restore order to M e x i c o . ^

Some accounts say

11
Wilson actually conducted a meeting in which Generals Diaz and Huerta
agreed to overthrow Madero.

The agreement made public at the U. S. Embassy

is known as the Pact of the Embassy.

16

In any event, Huerta secured Madero's resignation on February 18, 1913,
and had himself sworn in as president.

As Madero was being driven from the

Presidential palace to the penitentiary, he was assassinated.

The official

version of the death maintained that Madero was killed in the confusion when
a group of his supporters tried to free him.

17

The Madero assassination turned U. S. opinion against Huerta.

The

Taft administration left the question of recognizing Huerta to Woodrow
Wilson.

Despite Ambassador Wilson's urging, President Wilson refused to

recognize Huerta.

In fact, the President did everything he could to see

Huerta out of office.

He believed that Huerta's government failed to meet

the requirements for legitimacy outlined in the Mexican Constitution and
was therefore unworthy of recognition.
President Wilson indirectly supported the Constitutionalist opposi
tion to Huerta (Venustiano Carranza, Pancho Villa, Alvaro Obregon, and
Emiliano Zapata) by lifting the ban on arms exports, thus allowing
munitions from the United States to reach the Constitutionalists.

18

Wilson made various offers of help to Carranza, but Carranza was unwilling to compromise his position by inviting U. S. control of the Revolution.
Wilson dealt the Huerta regime its final blow in the spring of 1914
when he ordered the occupation of Veracruz.

The occupation was the

result of an incident in the port of Tampico where a party of sailors from
the USS Dolphin had been arrested for wandering into a restricted area.
Though the sailors were released within an hour with an official apology,

19

12
U. S. Rear Admiral Henry T. Mayo demanded that the Mexicans present a
twenty-one gun salute to the American flag.
these demands.

President Wilson supported

When Mexico refused to salute,the United States planned a

naval demonstration.^
The plan was revised when it was learned that a munitions shipment
for Huerta had been received at Veracruz.

President Wilson decided to

capture the munitions and ordered Veracruz to be taken.
casualties exceeded 300, including civilians.

21

Mexican

Nineteen American marines

and sailors died.
The American occupation of Veracruz from April to November contribut
ed to Huerta's resignation by blocking federal revenues from the custom
house.

Huerta's military, economic, and diplomatic strength were all

deteriorating, but in his resignation statement of July 8, 1914, Huerta
placed primary responsibility for what had happened on Wilson.

22

In the chaotic years following Huerta's resignation, the factions of
the Revolution began to fight among themselves.

In October, 1915, Presi

dent Wilson again interfered by recognizing General Carranza's de facto
government.

In so doing, Wilson ignored the claims of Pancho Villa who

was still in control of part of the country.

23

Villa, who had been

courting the United States for years, determined to take revenge.

In two

separate 1916 incidents, Villistas attacked a train in Chihuahua killing
fifteen Americans and crossed into New Mexico to burn the town of
Columbus, killing 18 Americans.
With popular backing, President Wilson ordered a punitive expedition
under General John J. Pershing to pursue Villa, but First Chief Carranza
ordered the expedition out of Mexico.

After a skirmish with Carranza's

13
troops raised tensions, the Pershing expedition withdrew.

24

The incident

seemed to threaten a war between the United States and Mexico which neither
government wanted.

As the United States drew nearer to war with Germany,

President Wilson no longer had time to deal with Mexican problems and
turned his attention to Europe.

25

By 1917 Carranza had consolidated his position and was elected
President.

After giving assurances that U. S. property would be protected,

Carranza was recognized de jure by Wilson in August, 1917.

26

While the events of 1910 to 1917 sharpened animosities on both sides
of the border, they have been forgotten in the United States today.

In

Mexico, however, the occupation of Veracruz and U. S. intervention in the
Revolution left a legacy of resentment that still arouses suspicions
toward the United States.

27

The years following the Mexican Revolution continued to be marked by
strife between the United States and Mexico.

Problems of recognition, oil

rights and protection of U. S. business interests remained unsettled.
In 1920 Alvaro Obregon was elected to a four year term as president
of Mexico after joining a revolt against Carranza that forced Carranza to
flee the capital.

Newly-elected United States President Warren G. Harding,

under the influence of a group of senators, refused to recognize the
Obregon government unless it agreed in writing to protect American citizens
and their property rights in Mexico.

The senators were concerned by

Article 27 of the Mexican Constitution under which all subsoil properties
belonged to the Mexican state.

The United States refused to recognize

Obregon's government for three years until after the Bucareli Conference
in 1923.

Then at the Conference it was agreed that oil lands would not

14
be seized under Article 27 if a "positive act" to drill oil had been taken
before May 1, 1917.

28

However, Plutarco Elias Calles, elected in 1924, ordered the oil
companies to exchange their titles of ownership for fifty year leases.
Enforcement of the law brought relations almost to the breaking point.

The

controversy was settled by U. S. Ambassador Dwight Morrow who suggested
that the matter by settled in the Mexican courts.

An official release of

the U. S. government acknowledged that the petroleum controversy had been
solved by the Mexican government.

The United States had finally recognized

full Mexican sovereignty even where U. S. interests were involved.
The question of oil again surfaced during the Lazaro Cardenas admin
istration.

In 1938 Cardenas nationalized the foreign oil companies when

they refused to obey a Supreme Court decision to honor a labor contract.
The President maintained that the companies had flagrantly defied the
sovereignty of the Mexican state.

29

The oil companies used legal, propaganda, and economic weapons to
fight the expropriation, but for all intents and purposes the two govern
ments remained stalemated over the oil question until 1941.

Just before

World War II, the United States and Mexico signed a General Agreement that
had been in the making for months.

The Agreement settled oil and agrarian

claims and worked out a trade treaty.

30

United States - Mexican affairs had begun to improve slightly in
the late twenties with the ambassadorship of Dwight Morrow and continued
to improve throughout the Good Neighbor era of the Roosevelt presidency.
When Franklin Roosevelt assumed office in 1933, he abandoned the policy of
intervention which had produced little more than resentment.

U. S.

15
acceptance of Mexico’s oil expropriation emphasized the change in U. S.
policies. ^

The Postwar Years - Improved Relations
With the issues of oil rights, property damages, and intervention
out of the way by World War II, each country turned its attention elsewhere.
Mexico entered a period of great economic growth while the United States
became more involved with global problems.

32

Tensions relaxed and relations

between the two countries were usually friendly until the 1970’s.

Boundary

and water issues that had been a source of friction for years were finally
settled during this period.
The Chamizal controversy, which was settled in 1963, dated back to
1864 when the Rio Grande suddenly shifted south.

The change in the river’s

course transferred 600 acres of land from Mexico to Texas.

Arbitration

Commissions had never been able to settle the Chamizal dispute properly;
Mexicans regarded the Chamizal as evidence of Yankee imperialism.
summer of 1963, the Chamizal problem was finally settled.

In the

Lyndon Johnson

and Lopez Mateos formalized the agreement in September, 1964, after John
Kennedy’s death.

33

An agreement to control the salinity of the Colorado River was also
reached.

According to a 1944 water treaty the United States is required

to send 1.5 million acre-feet of agricultural quality Colorado River water
to Mexico annually.

The postwar growth of the American Southwest put great

strains on the water supply.

By 1960 the Colorado River water reaching

Mexico was damaging the productivity of Mexican farms because it was too
salty after being used for irrigation in the United States.

Although the

United States spent millions from 1961 to 1972 to improve the water

16
quality, it was still too salty.
By the early 1970’s the problem was acute enough that President Luis
Echeverria declared the salinity of the Colorado River to be the major
issue between the two countries.

Finally, in 1972 President Richard Nixon

agreed to large-scale desalinization of the Colorado.

The agreement was

enacted by Congress in the 1974 Colorado River Basin Salinity Act thus
settling the controversy.^
Other areas of concern have been resolved with cooperative programs.
Narcotics control is conducted through joint investigations by U. S. and
Mexican agencies.

35

Pollution problems along the boundary are studied by

the International Boundary and Water Commission.

Consultative mechanisms

established in 1976 consider common problems in trade, investment, energy
and minerals, tourism, and areas of social concern.

With cooperation on

these issues and also on numerous routine matters such as coordination of
air traffic control and protection of cultural property,
remain basically sound.

37

relations

However, by the early 1970’s the friendship was

showing signs of strain.
Mexico’s president, Luis Echeverria, acting as a Third World spokes
man, promoted the Charter of Economic Rights and Duties at the United
Nations in 1974.

The Charter detailed the desires of the less developed

countries for a new international economic order.

Although President Ford

complimented Echeverria on the "very great merit and very great support"
that the Charter had, the United States voted agianst it because of
objections to two clauses.

One gave every state the right to expropriate

foreign property and pay only whatever compensation was deemed adequate by
its own laws.

The other gave states the right to form associations of

17
producers of primary products such as the Organization of Petroleum Export
ing Countries.

The United States vote was in line with long-standing and

well-known American policies, but following Ford's public statements it
came as a disappointment to Mexico.

38

At the same time, Echeverria's role as a Third World spokesman was
frowned upon in the United States.

A group of Congressmen became so

concerned that they issued President Ford a warning that Mexico was
"going communist."

39

It was expected that the atmosphere would improve with the presiden
cies of Jimmy Carter and Jose Lopez Portillo, who were both elected in
1976.

As a sign of goodwill, Carter invited Lopez Portillo to be the

first foreign leader he received.

40

However, by 1977 differences over

natural gas sales and immigration had clouded relations between the two.
In 1976 Mexico discovered large new deposits of oil and gas and in
1977 made arrangements to sell two million cubic feet of natural gas to a
group of United States companies.

The Carter administration refused to

sanction the sale because it felt the Mexican price was too high.

41

This

move embarrassed President Lopez Portillo, who had insisted on constructing
an 1,100 mile pipeline to Texas for the purpose of selling Mexican gas to
the United States.

42

The dispute over the price of natural gas was

eventually settled in 1979.
The issue of immigration, which also marred Carter's relations with
Lopez Portillo, is a persistent problem that seems to defy solution.

It

was one of the biggest areas of concern in U. S. - Mexican relations in
the 1970's.
The most recent immigration crisis resulted from a 1976 change in
the U. S. immigration laws which cut the number of legal Mexican immigrants
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allowed to 20,000 per year.
40,000

43

Prior to the change Mexico had been allowed

immigrants per year, and with the preference system for relatives

the actual number of immigrants allowed was about 60,000.

44

In an attempt to enforce the new, lower limit, the Carter administra
tion extended the border fence by six miles causing an uproar in Mexico
over the "tortilla curtain."

45

A bill submitted by President Carter to

enforce the immigration laws without first consulting Mexico caused a
further setback in relations.

46

After Ronald Reagan came to office, attention shifted from problems
of immigration and energy to differences in foreign policy.

Mexico has

always tried to maintain independence from Washington where its foreign
policy is concerned.

Because of its experiences with the United States,

and earlier with France, nonintervention has been the mainstay of Mexico's
foreign policy.

Mexico has consistently opposed U. S. interference in

other Latin American nations including Guatemala, the Dominican Republic,
and Cuba.

47

During the Cuban Missile Crisis President Lopez Mateos refused

to go along with U. S. condemnation of the Castro regime, and Mexico voted
against Cuba's expulsion from the Organization of American States.

In

spite of dissent over Mexico's independent foreign policy, the United
States and Mexico remained on good terms.
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In this tradition, Mexico has expressed increasing concern about the
conflict in Central America.

Mexico, along with Panama, Venezuela and

Colombia— the Contadora Group— has tried to bring negotiated settlements
to the conflicts in Central America.

The Reagan administration has

ignored or downplayed the Contadora Group's efforts, endorsing the search
for peace while financing covert war against the Sandinistas in Nicaragua
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and increasing military aid to El Salvador.

49

However, the United States

and Mexico have publicly minimized differences of opinion, emphasizing the
mutual belief that economic and social problems are at the root of regional
difficulties.

50

Though differences with Mexico in the past few years seem sharp, they
are only part of the normal ups and downs experienced by the United States
and Mexico during the postwar era.

Problems which cause great alarm when

they arise, such as narcotics control and Colorado River salinity, are
eventually ironed out and seen as evidence of the cooperative spirit
existing between the two countries.

Even the decade of the seventies,

which seemed relatively contentious, produced positive developments.

Coop

eration on narcotics control continues, and the associated problem of
treatment of U. S. citizens arrested in Mexico was also settled by a
treaty of 1976.

In 1979 after the IXTOC I oil spill in the Bay of Campeche

was capped, a joint marine pollution contingency plan was worked out."^
Other problems such as immigration, trade issues, and energy are of
such magnitude as to seem virtually insoluable.

They will continue to be

a source of friction in the relationship, but efforts to reach agreement,
or at least compromise, are continually underway.

Thus, the cordial tone

present in U. S. - Mexican relations since World War II is likely to
continue even in the face of these problems.

The attitudes of the past,

however, have not been completely abandoned.

At times old suspicions

influence present policies.

The Mexican government has to work around an

anti-American nationalism when dealing with the United States.

Especially

in the fields of trade and oil, Mexican law attempts to limit foreign
control in order to prevent a repeat of the economic invasion of the Diaz
era.
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II.

TRADE

Importance of Trade
Trade is an important element in the U. S. - Mexican relationship.
It provides contact between the people of the two nations through border
trade, tourism, investment transactions, and the export-import trade; it
is the basis on which the countries deal with one another.

Though trade

is advantegeous to both the United States and Mexico, it is more essential
to Mexico than to the United States.

Mexico has worked to limit its

economic dependence on foreign countries since its Revolution, and has
largely succeeded.

However, United States business and banking are still

essential to Mexican prosperity.

While both countries wish to promote a

healthy, growing Mexican eocnomy, their approach is not always the same.
This chapter will look at the role trade plays between the United States
and Mexico, and review how differences and similarities in trade policies
affect relations.
Although the United States and Mexico have not had a bilateral trade
treaty since 1950, a large volume of trade is conducted despite the lack
of any mutually agreed upon formal procedures.

In 1981 U. S. - Mexican

merchandise trade amounted to over $30 billion.
Mexico depends on the United States for trade to a far greater
degree than the United States depends on Mexico.

While Mexico is a

valuable trading partner for the United States, it supplies the U. S.
with only 3 to 5 percent of its imports and purchases only 4 to 7 percent
23
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of U. S. exports.^

The United States, on the other hand, is Mexico's
i

closest trading partner supplying about 63 percent of its imports and
buying about 60 percent to 70 percent of its exports (see Table 1,
United States-Mexican Trade).
Mineral fuels and related materials are the United States' biggest
imports from Mexico counting for over half of all goods imported from
Mexico in 1980 (see Table 2, Composition of United States-Mexican Trade).
Even so oil supplied by Mexico represents only 5 percent of U. S. national
consumption.

2

Other commodities imported from Mexico by the United States

include tropical agricultural products (e.g. cotton, coffee), farm products
(e.g. strawberries and winter vegetables), and minerals including copper,
3
lead and zinc.
While the United States imports mostly raw materials and food from
Mexico, capital goods are Mexico's chief import from the United States.
Mexico will have to continue importing large quantities of machinery in
order to sustain its growth rate and fulfill its plans to develop industry,
agriculture, and energy resources.
the United States.

Much

ofthis equipment will

come from

Thus, Mexico relies

on U. S. imports toimplement its

development plans making the composition

of imports, as well as the quan

tity, a factor in Mexico's dependence on

the United States.

Besides relying on the United States for trade in goods, Mexico draws
70 percent of its tourist and border sales from U. S. customers, and makes
nearly 100 percent of its similar purchases in the United States.”*
Tourism is an important export for both nations, ranking second behind
machinery and transport equipment for the U. S. and behind mineral fuels
and lubricants for Mexico.

Table 1
UNITED STATES - MEXICAN TRADE

Mexico

sl

United States

b

Exports to U.S.
Total Exports

Imports from U.S.
Total Imports

Exports to Mexico
Total Exports

Imports from Mexico
Total Imports

1975

58%

63%

4.8%

3.1%

1976

57%

63%

4.3%

2.9%

1977

60%

64%

4.0%

3.1%

1978

66%

60%

4.6%

3.5%

1979

69%

63%

5.4%

4.2%

1980

63%

66%

6.9%

5.1%

1981

60%

81%

ci
U.S., Department of Commerce, Office of Trade and Investment Analysis, Trade
Information and Analysis, International Trade Administration, "United States Foreign
Trade Annual 1975-1981," Overseas Business Reports, July, 1983, p. 30.
"United States Trade with Major Trading Partners 1974-1980," Overseas Business
Reports, November, 1982, p. 3.
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Table 2
COMPOSITION OF UNITED STATES - MEXICAN TRADE

1980 United States Exports to Mexico
Commodity

Value in Dollars

Food and Live Animals .....................
Beverages and Tobacco
Crude Materials-Inedible, Except Fuel ....
Mineral Fuels, Lubricants, Etc
Animal & Vegetable Oils, Fats & Waxes .....
Chemicals & Related Products NSPF
Manufactured Goods by Chief Material ......
Machinery and Transport Equipment .........
Miscellaneous Manufactured Articles
Comm & Trans Not Classified E l s e w h e r e
TOTAL

1 908
2
1 078
340
90
1 441
2 063
6 563
856
535

335
630
683
863
273
454
395
454
575
768

291
206
974
046
751
415
099
045
269
147

14 884 767 863

SOURCE:
U. S., Department of Commerce, Bureau of the
Census, U. S. Exports, World Area by Commodity Groupings,
Annual 1980.

1980 United States Imports from Mexico
Commodity
Food and Live Animals
Beverages and Tobacco
Crude Materials, Inedible, Except Fuel ....
Minerals, Fuels, Lubrcnts & Reltd Matrl ...
Oils and Fats, Animal and Vegetable
Chemicals and Related Products, NSPF ......
Manufactured Goods by Chief Material
Machinery & Transport Equipment ...........
Miscellaneous Mfrd Articles, NSPF
Articles Not Provided for E l s e w h e r e
TOTAL

Value in Dollars
1 316
98
208
6 592
3
275
762
2 046
870
344

199
236
910
592
756
147
621
961
283
757

557
877
092
893
650
484
146
216
481
844

12 519 467 240

SOURCE:
U. S., Department of Commerce, Bureau of the
Census, U. S. General Imports, World Area by Commodity
Groupings, Annual 1980.
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In addition, 70 percent of all direct foreign investment in Mexico is
from the United States; however, foreign investment accounts for only about
4 percent of Mexico's total private investment.
had about $5.8 billion invested in Mexico
investment of $192.6 billion.^

In 1979 the United States

out of a total U. S. overseas

These figures show that while U. S. invest

ment in Mexico is substantial, it is not an overwhelming force.

Nonetheless,

it is vital to the growth of Mexico's manufacturing sector— the area to
which Mexican law funnels most foreign capital.
Mexico is obviously valuable to the United States as a trade partner,
but the United States is not dependent on Mexico.

In contrast, Mexico

relies mainly on the United States as a customer for its exports, as a
supplier for its imports, and as a source of outside capital.

This has

been a basic element of U. S. - Mexican relations since the time of Diaz,
a fact that Mexico would like to alter.

The disparity between the United

States and Mexico in the trade relationship gives Mexico good reason to
distrust U. S. influence over its economy.

United States Trade Policy
The stated foreign policy objectives of the United States regarding
Mexico reflect the importance of trade to the relationship.

Objectives

include:
1.

Maintaining friendly relations and cooperation between Mexico
and the United States.

2.

Cooperating in developing a modern economy, linked with other
countries of the hemisphere} including the U. S., through a
mutually beneficial system of trade and investment.

3.

Encouraging U. S. private investment in the form needed for
Mexico's growth; and
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4.

Settling differences in .the spirit of mutual respect and
neighborly understanding.

Speaking specifically of foreign trade policies, the United States,
particularly under the Reagan administration, favors noninterventionist
policies that allow market forces to distribute trade and investment.

The

United States would like to see nontarrif barriers and export subsidies
eliminated, particularly in the two most important areas of American
9

competitiveness— high technology and agriculture.

The U. S. is also

interested in having barriers to trade inservices reduced.

The United

States believes that these goals could be accomplished through the
General Agreement on Trade and Tariffs (GATT) which it would like to see
strengthened and expanded to increase participation of the developing
nations. 10
Trade between the United States and Mexico has no firm treaty struc
ture, but most Mexican imports to the United States are subject to the
"most favored nation" provision of the Tariff Agreements Act of 1934 and
the Generalized System of Preferences in the Trade Act of 1974, amended by
the Trade Agreement of 1979.
As a most favored nation, Mexico benefits from all trade concessions
which the United States grants to any other trade partners that are also
most favored nations.

The Generalized System of Preferences enables

countries, mostly underdeveloped nations, to send exports to the United
States free of duties.
President Gerald Ford implemented the Generalized System of
Preferences (GSP) as provided for in the Trade Act of 1974 on January 1,
1976.

It basically divided all U. S. imports when exported by certain

developing countries into three categories:

those not eligible for

29
duty-free GSP treatment, those eligible for such treatment, and those
eligible except as limited by competitive need provisions.
Competitive need excludes a nation's exports of a product from
duty-free GSP treatment when the product accounts for 50 percent or more
of U. S. imports of the item, or when exports of the item from the country
totalled $25 million the preceding year.

This figure is annually adjusted

upward according to growth rate of U. S. gross national product.

In

addition, to be eligible for GSP the cost or value of materials produced
in the exporting country plus direct cost of processing operations per
formed there must equal at least 50 percent of the appraised value at the
time of entry into U. S. customs territory.
originally 35 percent.

The minimum content was

12

Mexico is the fourth largest utilizer of U. S. GSP with over $639
million of goods sold duty-free in 1981.

However, only 7 or 8 percent of

annual Mexican exports to the United States have ever entered duty-free
under GSP.

Of the one-fourth or so of Mexican exports that are eligible

for U. S. GSP every year, about 30 percent are not qualified--usually
because they fail to meet the 50 percent minimum content limit.

Another

40 percent by value are denied GSP due to the competitive need limitation.
In 1981 the United States began a system of "graduation" under which
duty-free treatment for more economically advanced developing countries
was limited on a product-by-product basis.

Graduation is intended to

expand GSP benefits for less competitive developing countries.
accelerated in 1982.

It was

14

Mexico is critical of the competitive need restrictions on GSP and
strongly opposes the graduation concept.

In 1982 five of Mexico's

products worth $85 million were "graduated.

13
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Because the United States is a signatory of the General Agreement on
Trade and Tariffs, some of Mexico's exports to the United States are
subject to GATT regulations as well as most favored nation and GSP provi
sions.

The GATT regulations can be a problem for Mexico, which subsidises

industries to promote growth, because GATT allows countervailing duties to
be imposed in the case of export subsidies.

If goods are exported at

prices below those on the domestic market or sold at less than the estimated
cost of production, anti-dumping duties can be imposed by the United States.
In the case of countries that do not adhere to GATT, U. S. law allows
countervailing duties to be levied on dutiable articles without a determina
tion of material injury to U. S. producers.

If the article is duty-free,

however, material injury to the U. S. industry must be proved before a
countervailing duty is imposed.

16

Along the border there is a special category of trade known as
"in-bond" industries or maquiladoras.

In 1965 this trade was established

by Mexico in Free Trade Zones near the northern border to help solve the
immigration problem.

17

Since 1972 the maquiladoras have been allowed to

locate anywhere in Mexico, but 90 percent of the 600 or more plants are
still located in border cities.

The maquiladoras produce finished goods

from components imported from the United States and reexported for sale.
The plants operate under a variety of exemptions from Mexican law
including blanket authorization for 100 percent foreign ownership.

18

The reciprocal provisions of U. S. law are Sections 806 and 807 of
the U. S. Tariff Schedule which allow goods produced in the United States
to be shipped to Mexico for assembly and reexported to the United States
paying duty only on the value-added through production in Mexico.

This
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allows the labor-intensive phase of U. S. manufacturing to be performed in
M
j
19
Mexico.
Although U. S. labor groups oppose Sections 806 and 807 on the
grounds that they transfer U. S. jobs to lower-wage foreign production,
United Stated Government analysts disagree.

They believe that the in-

bond industries benefit U. S. labor by preventing the entire production
operation from moving off shore.

20

The maquiladoras program also benefits

Mexican labor, employing about 120,000 people (1980).

21

Mexican Trade Policy
Mexico's recent foreign trade policy includes the following:
1) protection of national industry, 2) promotion of exports, especially
manufactured and semi-manufactured goods, 3) promotion of geographic and
commodity trade diversification, 4) discouragement of consumer goods
imports and preference for material and capital goods imports, and
5) rejection of GATT.

22

Mexico's general policy regarding imports is protectionist.

Major

policy objectives are import substitution by domestic products as a
means to develop manufacturing industries, and diversification of trade to
acquire self-sufficiency, new markets, and new supply sources.

Import

substitution is implemented through government purchasing policies, import
licensing, and tariff barriers.

23

As part of a drive to develop export markets, Mexico had planned
to drop the import licensing system in favor of a tariff system by 1982.
The intention was to lessen protection, thus forcing local manufacturers
over time to meet world market standards.

24

However, in the summer of

1981 Mexico reversed its trade liberalization policy in response to
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balance of payments problems.

Import tariffs were raised, and by August,

1982, all imports again required an import license.

25

Tariff structures are also used to influence imports of consumer
and capital goods.

Consumer goods which are produced by Mexican industry

are subject to tariff rates of 60 percent to 100 percent.

Industrial

machinery needed for development purposes usually has a 20 percent duty,
and some products, including essential raw materials and agricultural
products, are imported duty free.
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With respect to GATT, Mexico decided in 1980 to postpone membership
indefinitely despite the favorable conditions provided by its Protocol of
Accession.
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The terms of the Protocol were considered extremely liberal.

Mexico would have had twelve years to eliminate its import permits.

Bi

lateral tariff concessions negotiated with the United States in the Tokyo
Round would have been incorporated into the agreement.
system of tariff valuation was accepted.

The new Mexican

Mexico would have been allowed

to continue granting tax incentives to industry, provided these did not
harm other GATT members.

Mexico was insured full rights to protect

industry and agriculture, and GATT recognized Mexico's protectionist
policy on rural products.

Finally, Mexico would have had the right to

ignore any GATT provisions covering nontariff trade barriers that were
incompatible with existing Mexican legislation.

28

President Lopez Portillo originally favored accession to GATT, but
after a national debate in which nationalists i.in the intellectual community,
protectionists in the private sector, and government planners opposed
Mexico's entry he changed his mind.

Labor unions and mass-based groups

were not heavily involved in the debate.

29

On March 18, 1980, the
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forty-second anniversary of the nationalization of the oil companies,
Lopez Portillo announced that Mexico would not accede as a contracting
member to GATT.

30

The GATT decision was based partly on a desire to protect small and
medium-scale industry, and partly on a preference for bilateralism in
relations with industrial countries.

Mexico believes that bilateral

agreements provide a better opportunity than GATT to use petroleum as a
weapon to gain trade advantages and acquire scarce technology.

31

The

decision was also a reflection of Mexico's desire to maintain trading and
investment independence, especially from the United States.

In the

United States, Mexico's decision caused surprise and anger, followed by a
"wait and see" attitude.

32

To avoid foreign domination of its industry, as in the nineteenth
century, Mexico now has laws limiting foreign investment.

Foreign

companies operating in Mexico must acquire permits in which they agree to
consider themselves as Mexican nationals subject to Mexican laws, and not
to seek special protection from their own governments.
are not open to foreign participation.

33

Some industries

The petroleum and forest industries

are restricted solely to Mexican ownership, while as of 1961 the mining
industry must have majority Mexican ownership.

In 1973, under Echeverria,

the laws were tightened to require majority Mexican participation in all
new investments except where it is in the national interest to waive the
requirement.

34

Direct foreign investment is allowed if it does not

compete with domestic investment and if it brings otherwise unobtainable
technology into the country.

35

Foreign investment is particularly

welcome if it will help reduce imports or expand exports.

36
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Policy Differences
Protectionist measures and domestic pressure to impose protectionist
policies in both Mexico and the United States are key trade issues which
continue to cause friction between the countries.
Besides being opposed to GSP restrictions on its exports, Mexico has
long been critical of U. S. tariff and non-tariff barriers which it feels
restrict its exports to the United States.

As an example, Mexico believes

that U. S. restrictions on size and color are used to shut out its
strawberry and tomato exports.

37

American business in turn complains of unfair advantages enjoyed by
Mexican exporters.

As previously mentioned, the tariff laws are criticized

by some sectors in the United States for encouraging "runaway plants."
United States exporters object to Mexico's policy of supplementing high
tariff walls with an import licensing system to protect its industrial
sector from competition.

In addition to tariffs and import licensing,

Mexico uses indirect controls such as domestic content requirements to
protect industries, particularly the automotive industry.

38

United States

agricultural producers believe that Mexico dumps winter vegetables on the
U. S. market.

39

Tomatoes are a particular problem drawing annual objec

tions from United States farmers, and creating hostile press in both
countries.

40

Florida tomato growers petitioned for a ruling that Mexican

growers were contravening the 1921 Antidumping Act by selling at below
cost in the United States,

41

but in March, 1980, the Commerce Department

ruled that Mexican winter vegetables were not being dumped in the United
States.

Florida growers have appealed the decision.

42

Fishing is another trade area that has caused friction in recent
years.

Shrimp fishing in the Gulf of Mexico has been a source of conflict,

35
but the most recent problems involve Pacific Ocean tuna.

In 1976 Mexico

extended its exclusive economic zone (EEZ) to 200 miles.

Since tuna are

migratory, fishing fleets must follow them wherever they go, and owners
of U. S. tuna boats claim they cannot afford the exorbitant license fees
required for fishing in Mexico’s EEZ.

In July, 1980, Mexico seized

several U. S. tuna boats; in retaliation the United States banned the
import of fish from Mexico.

43

These actions threatened the three year old

negotiations for United States access to Mexican waters.

44

In January, 1981, Mexico terminated all fishing accords with the
United States including accords on grouper and snapper as well as tuna.
Mexico's action was triggered by the United States' refusal to allocate
Mexico more squid catch in the North Atlantic.

45

Although the extent of United States - Mexican trade serves to
bind the two countries together, it also creates numerous sources of
friction.

Mexico feels that the United States is hampering its economic

development through the use of quality restrictions, quotas, anti-dumping
charges and tariffs.

As Lopez Portillo stated in an address to the United

States Congress, restrictions on imports aggravate economic problems by
causing unemployment.

46

At the same time that Mexico urges the United

States to relax trade restrictions on Mexican imports, it implements
tariff and import licensing policies to block exports from the United
States.^
Trade relations between the United States and Mexico are made more
difficult by historic factors and Mexico’s strong desire to establish
economic independence.

Despite the occasions for disagreement presented

by trade it is an element that strengthens the ties between the two

36
countries.

The extent of D, S. - Mexican trade is such that neither

nation could easily afford a deterioration in relations; this has been
increasingly true in the case of oil.
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III.

OIL

History
With the discovery of enormous new oil deposits in 1976, Mexico
became of more interest to the United States than it had been since
before World War II.

Mexico's oil provides an alternative to reliance on

oil from the unstable Middle East.

Though Mexico follows OPEC price

policies, its oil is less expensive for the United States than OPEC oil
because transportation costs are lower.

Mexican oil has the advantages

of being close, secure and plentiful— estimates of Mexico's proven
reserves are still rising.
The story of Mexico's oil relations with foreign companies reveals
how Mexico was dominated by outside interests at the beginning of this
century, and how oil came to serve as a symbol of Mexican nationalism and
sovereignty.

Today Mexico's oil dealings are still partly shaped by

nationalist sentiment.

This chapter will detail the development of

Mexico's oil resources from the days when the industry was controlled by
foreign companies through the 1976 oil discovery, and examine U. S. and
Mexican oil policies.
Oil is Mexico's largest export to the United States.

Throughout

this century it has also been one of the greatest sources of controversy
between the countries, encompassing as it ddes both profits and pride.
Until the time of Porfirio Diaz, Mexico's law followed the
Spanish tradition of vesting ownership of subsoil resources in the crown.
40
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Then in order to obtain foreign investment, Diaz altered the law to
follow the Anglo-Saxon tradition of vesting subsoil ownership in the
owner of the surface property.
From 1901 to 1910 the Mexican oil industry fell under the control
of British and American investors who came to control over 70 percent of
Mexican crude production.^

Production was modest, but it picked up

during the next years with the advent of World War I and assembly line
production of automobiles.
the world's oil supply.

By 1921 Mexico was producing one-fourth of

However, during the decade of the twenties

Mexico's oil production dropped sharply, until by 1930 Mexico produced
only 3 percent of world oil.

The decrease in production was partly due

to Mexican cutbacks and partly to increased oil activity in Texas,
California, Oklahoma, the Soviet Union and Venezuela.

During the

twenties American oil interests in Mexico surpassed the British interests
to gain control of 77 percent of Mexican oil production.

This was the

only time that American oil companies dominated the Mexican oil industry.
After 1934 new British discoveries once again made British interests
predominant.

o

The growth of the oil industry had occurred during the Mexican
Revolution.

The companies were not adversely affected by the war

3
because the oil fields were remote from large-scale military activity.
By 1916, however, changes brought by the Revolution began to affect the
oil industry.

A technical commission appointed by Venestiano Carranza

concluded, " . . .

it is only right that that which belongs to the nation—

the subsoil resources of coal and oil— be restored to it."^
The Constitution of 1917, produced by the victorious Carranza
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faction, upheld the principle of private property so long as it served a
social purpose.

One reform embodied in the Constitution was the return

to the Spanish custom of distinguishing surface property from subsoil
property.
Article 27, paragraph iv, of the 1917 Constitution eliminated
ownership rights to oil and coal reserves, though concessions could be
obtained by Mexican citizens.

Foreigners could also obtain concessions

if they agreed to consider themselves as nationals and promised not to
invoke the protection of their governments.^
In February, 1918, Carranza decreed that the subsoil petroleum
belonged to the nation, and that parties wishing to exploit it must
apply for concessions regardless of whether their leases or property
titles had been formalized before 1917.

The United States issued formal

protests against the decree which changed land titles to mere concessions.
When the Carranza government was overthrown by a group of generals
and Alvaro Obregon was elected president, the United States withheld
recognition until the Obregon government recognized the property rights
of American citizens in Mexico.

The first two years of Obregon's term

were filled with rumors of subversive activities sponsored by the oil
firms, and of U. S. invasions of Mexico, also supposedly to be backed by
the oil firms.
Obregon was caught between the need for U. S. recognition to help
stabilize his government and the need to satisfy Mexican nationalists.
The Bucareli Conference in 1923 finally provided a solution to the
problem.

The United States recognized the change in the status

subsoil ownership from absolute property titles to "confirmatory

of

A3
concessions."

In return Mexico agreed to such a broad definition of the

"positive acts" principle that the oil companies were allowed to keep
most of their property.^
The "positive acts" principle was embodied in five decisions of the
Mexican Supreme Court regarding injunctions brought by the oil firms
against the Carranza decrees.

The Court ruled in 1921 that Article 27,

paragraph iv, was not retroactive in the case of lands on which a
"positive act" had been carried out.

A positive act was some drilling

or activity to indicate the "owners intention to extract oil prior to
May 1, 1917," when the Constitution had taken effect.^
Obregon's successor, Plutarco Calles, brought relations nearly to
the breaking point when he used a narrower interpretation of "positive
acts" in demanding that the oil companies exchange their property titles
for fifty year concessions to drill.

According to some sources,

Washington even considered invading Mexico in 1927 or lending support to
Q
Mexican rebels.
Relations improved when President Calvin Coolidge appointed Dwight
Morrow as the United States Ambassador to Mexico.

Morrow worked out an

agreement with Calles (1928) under which Mexico returned to the Bucareli
Conference's broad definition of "positive acts."

In exchange the

United States agreed that future application of Mexico's oil laws would
be settled in Mexican courts rather than through diplomatic intervention.
This provision displeased the oil companies.^
The Morrow-Calles Agreement lasted until the Lazero Cardenas
administration again took up the fight against foreign capital.

Events

beginning in 1936 changed Mexico's relations with the oil industry.
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First, an expropriation law aimed at essential industries was passed.
However, the oil and mining industries were assured that they were safe
from expropriation.

Second, President Cardenas consolidated nineteen oil

unions into one organization.

It went on strike after the oil companies

rejected its demands for higher wages and staffing provisions that would

l
have led to union control of the industry.

The oil companies continued

to disregard government insistence on higher salaries even after the
government threatened to put the industry in the hands of official
supervisors.^-®

The companies finally agreed to the 26 million peso wage

increase after the Mexican Supreme Court ordered them to comply, but the
firms couldn't agree to the administrative clauses.

The government decid

ed that expropriation was the best way to protect its workers and sover
eignty.

On March 18, 1938, the expropriation of the oil industry was

announced.

The expropriation applied to only the surface lands because

the oil itself already belonged to M e x i c o . ^
The companies, however, regarded the subsoil deposits as their
absolute property and demanded prompt indemnization.

In retaliation for

the expropriation of their property, the oil companies instigated a
boycott to prevent the export of Mexican oil.
went along with the boycott.

The U. S. State Department

In addition, the United States suspended

its direct purchases of silver from Mexico.

1?

The protests eventually

died down as the United States became involved in World War II, and
worked out an agreement with Mexico.
The State Department began work on an agreement to assess the value
of the nationalized property in 1941, but the United States, Mexico, and
the oil companies all came up with different estimates of the property
value.

Included in the State Department estimate was the value of the
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subsoil hydrocarbons.

By April, 1942, a joint commission had worked out

an agreement which was finally accepted in October, 1943, by Standard Oil
of New Jersey, the last U. S. oil company in Mexico.

The agreement was

signed a month later.
The Mexican government agreed to pay the oil companies $30 million
in installments by 1947.

Though the agreement never stated that it

included payment for the value of subsoil deposits, in practice it did.
By not specifying whether the hydrocarbons were compensated for, the
agreement made it possible for Mexico to assume that the oil companies
acknowledged Mexico's ownership of the subsoil hydrocarbons.

It was

equally possible for the United States to assume that the agreement
tacitly recognized ownerhsip by the oil companies since the companies
were compensated for the oil.
The method of payments (installments) had been a source of
disagreement too, and Mexico won this part of the argument.

The oil

companies originally had demanded prompt, effective, and adequate payment
as traditionally provided under international law.

13

The settlement of the expropriation dispute was made possible by
the international situation after 1940.

The crisis in Europe and Asia

required hemispheric unity and Roosevelt's Good Neighbor Policy had
rejected the use of force, so Mexico finally felt safe from the rumored
threats of U. S. invasion and subversion.

Thanks largely to the pressures

on Washington created by World War II, expropriation was established as
an irreversible fact by 1943.-^
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Oil Relations
The nationalization of oil was an immensely popular move in
Mexico— March 18 is celebrated as a holiday.

However, Mexico could not

keep up either production or exploration without outside capital and
technical aid, which for several years were hard to obtain.

Nonetheless,

Mexico’s state-owned oil company, Pemex, kept the country supplied with
fuel oil and gasoline until after 1957 when Mexico became a net importer
of petroleum.
In the early 1970's Mexican oil production fell even further behind
domestic demand.

Imports, though still slight, increased.

This increase

in imported oil occurred just as the Organization of Petroleum Exporting
Countries (OPEC) raised prices.

In 1972 Mexico's oil imports had cost

$124 million; by 1974 the cost was $382 million.

In addition to oil

imports, President Echeverria had allowed high imports of supplies for
the industrial plant in order to increase the pace of development.

The

imports were financed by increased foreign borrowing which led to infla-^
tion, balance of payments deficits, and devaluation of the peso.'*"'’
This economic crisis pushed the Mexican government into a decision
to open oil sites explored as long ago as 1964.^

in 1975 Lopez Portillo

announced the discovery of huge oil and gas deposits.

Development of the

oil fields eliminated the need to import oil, and the exports of oil
temporarily improved the balance of payments situation.

From 1976 to

1977 Mexico's balance of payments deficit dropped from over $3 billion
to less than $1.8 billion.^
As exploration has continued, the estimates of Mexico's reserves
have continued to rise.

Figures given by the Mexican government in 1980
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showed 60.1 billion barrels of proven reserves, 38 billion barrels of
probable reserves, and 250 billion barrels of possible reserves.

In his

1981 Informe de Gobierno, Lopez Portillo announced another increase in
proven reserves to 72 billion ba r r e l s . ^
Mexico intended to develop its oil at a rate compatible with its
economy and not in response to foreign desires for rapid expansion of oil
production.

The Mexican national program announced in 1980 set export

limits of 1.5 million barrels per day for oil and 300 million barrels per
day for gas through 1990.

The program did not specify production limits,

but tends to discourage sharp increases.
To avoid dependence on the United States, or any single country,
as an export market the energy program aims for a limit of 50 percent of
total oil exports sold to any one nation.-^

in the late seventies, 80

percent of Mexico's oil exports went to the United States, partly because
the United States was more likely than distant countries to prefer
Mexican oil supplies.
Mexico follows OPEC pricing policies, but is not a member of OPEC.
All customers pay the same price plus the transport cost.

Since the

United States is so close to Mexico, it pays a lower landing price for
Mexican crude than most countries.

OA

To promote diversification of

exports, Mexico invited Japan, Canada, France and other countries to
increase trade and investment in Mexico in exchange for increased oil
supplies.21
Mexican oil is a relatively secure supplemental supply for the
United States.

However, the official policy of the United States

government is that decisions on production and export levels should be
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made by Mexico with no D. S. pressure for increases.

President Carter

maintained that such decisions should be made exclusively by the Mexican
people.

Carter said that the United States was interested in purchasing

oil and gas, though it had no inclination to force Mexico to give it
on
special privileges.

The Reagan administration also follows this policy,

believing that market forces should determine U. S. imports of Mexican
oil and gas, and that a more aggressive strategy would only arouse
Mexican sensitivities about the national patrimony.

OO

An additional reason for U. S. restraint during the Carter adminis
tration was the fear that all-out production of Mexican petroleum would
cause spiralling inflation due to the rapid increase of revenue into the
economy.

It was thought that the best assurance of continued imports of
A /

Mexican crude was a stable Mexican economy.
The United States has purchased oil from Mexico for the Strategic
Petroleum Reserve,

9S

but other than that the U. S. does not buy oil from

Mexico on a government-to-government basis.

Politically, the Mexican

government could not afford to sell as much to the United States government as the United States now buys in private market transactions.

9 fi

In

1980 the U. S. purchased about 560,000 barrels of crude from Mexico per
day at a cost of $6 billion. ^

By 1982 Mexico had become the United

States' largest supplier of foreign oil.^®

Natural Gas Relations
Unlike oil, U. S. natural gas purchases are negotiated on a
government-to-government basis or else approved by the government.

In

1977 six U. S. companies had arranged to buy Mexican gas at $2.60/thousand,
which was the price of intrastate gas in Texas.

An 1,100 mile pipeline
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was to be built from the Cactus field in Tabasco to the Texas border.
However, U. S. Secretary of Energy James Schlesinger refused to sanction
the deal because the Administration was trying to pass the Natural Gas
Policy Act, a bill calling for a domestic gas ceiling of less than $2.00
per thousand cubic feet.

Allowing the import of Mexican gas at $2.60 per

thousand would have added unneeded complications to the passage of the
bill.

After the bill became law, Schlesinger continued to oppose the

Mexican gas deal because the price was higher than that of Canadian gas
0Q
at $2.18 per thousand cubic feet. v

This move caused major disillusionment between the Carter and
Lopez Portillo administrations.

The Mexicans felt that Schlesinger was

trying to take advantage of them because the United States was their only
potential customer.

They pointed out that Canada had refused to increase

gas sales to the United States since 1970.

In addition, they pointed to

Schlesinger's approval of a deal to pay $3.00 per thousand for frozen gas
from Soviet-oriented Algeria.

President Jose Lopez Portillo, therefore,

terminated the gas pipeline at Monterrey, and Mexico used the gas for
industry and home heating.

However, Mexico was unable to use all of the
OA

gas and millions of cubic feet were flared daily.
President Lopez Portillo had insisted on constructing the 1,100
mile pipeline to Texas making clear his intention to sell Mexican gas to
the United States.

His opponents had favored the construction of a

seventy mile pipeline to the Gulf of Mexico from which the gas would have
been shipped to the highest bidder.

The United States rejection of the

gas deal touched a raw nerve in Mexico, making it difficult for the
Lopez Portillo administration to offer favorable terms to the United
States on this or any other m a t t e r . ^
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Before President Carter’s February, 1979, visit to Mexico the U. S.
Department of Energy attempted to make the Mexican public aware of the
United States’ side of the gas purchase story.

The Department issued a

memo which gave the following reasons for refusing to meet Mexico's price:
1.

The price last offered by Mexico was the BTU equivalent
of distillate oil delivered in New York Harbor.
The
United States' position was that residual fuel oil, not
distillate, set the upper limit on competitive prices
for supplemental gas supplies.

2.

Mexican gas, even if priced at the equivalent of residual
oil, still would have been substantially more expensive
than domestic or Canadian natural gas. By asking for
higher prices than Canada, Mexico put the United States
in an awkward bind between two neighbors.

3.

Authorization of Mexican gas imports tied to a distillate
price might have imposed several short and long-term
penalties on U. S. energy consumers and producers.
In
the near term, the Energy Department estimated that it
could have added about $10 billion to consumer gas costs
in the United States through 1985.

4.

The Department of Energy concluded that negotiations with
Mexico resulting in heavily subsidized gas imports at the
expense of the nation's residual consumers would have cost
the United States several hundred million dollars more for
several hundred million less cubic feet of gas, with pos
sibly higher imports.
The Department stated that this
would have been "clearly the worst of all possible worlds."

In short, the United States believed the Mexican price demands to be
premature, and not in the interests of either country.

O^

During his visit to Mexico, President Carter tried to ease Mexican
resentment over the handling of the gas purchase.
task.

This was not an easy

President Lopez Portillo expressed the Mexican view of the canceled

purchase in this statement:

"Among permanent, not casual, neighbors

surprise moves and sudden deceit or abuse are poisonous fruits that
sooner or later have a reverse effect."

Lopez Portillo added that for

the first time in its history, because of a nonrenewable resource,
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Mexico suddenly found itself the center of American attention, "Attention
that is a surprising mixture of interest, disdain, and fear much like the
recurring vague fears you yourselves inspire in certain areas of our
national subconscious.^
In response, President Carter told the Mexican Congress that, as
good customers, the United States was prepared to pay a fair and just
price for the gas and oil that Mexico wished to s e l l . ^

In the joint

communique issued at the end of the trip, President Carter pledged to
develop means for expediting sales of surplus Mexican natural gas to the
United States.
After months of negotiations an agreement on natural gas was
reached in September, 1979.

The 1979 agreement was much smaller than the

1977 deal— 300 million cubic feet per day as opposed to the original 2.5
billion.

The price settled on was $3.65 per thousand cubic feet, to be

adjusted quarterly. ^

Debt Crisis
Mexico had planned to use its oil revenues to finance slow, careful
economic development.

The government wanted to promote high growth rates

to solve the unemployment problem, strengthen production of basic
consumer goods, encourage exports, develop natural resources, promote
growth of capital goods industries, decentralize industry from Mexico
City to the coasts and borders, and encourage development of small and
OQ

medium-sized companies.
Before the discovery of oil President Echeverria had relied
heavily on foreign borrowing to finance imports to build Mexico's
industrial plant.

By the end of his term in 1976 the external debt stood
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at $30.2 billion.

Echeverria's policies resulted in slow economic growth,

inflation, and devaluation of the peso.

Business lost confidence in the

economy and transferred capital out of the country.
When Lopez Portillo took office he imposed austerity measures and
increased oil and gas revenues.

Inflation remained high, rising to 30

percent for 1979 and 1980, but the peso stabilized and industrial
expansion continued.^

From 1978 through 1982 the gross national product

grew at an annual rate of 8 percent.
Although Mexico was originally intent on not producing oil at a
pace to cause inflation, Lopez Portillo was anxious to move ahead with
his development program and abandoned this policy.

As Luis Echeverria's

Finance Minister Lopez Portillo had said, "If we must choose between not
growing and borrowing, we prefer to borrow."^®

Like Echeverria, Lopez

Portillo borrowed heavily in order to finance such projects as oil
drilling, steel production, roads, hospitals, increased automobile
manufacturing,^-*- agricultural production, and nuclear reactors.

By 1983

the Mexican public sector debt had reached over $50 billion out of
Mexico's overall foreign debt of $80 billion. ^

Lopez Portillo had

planned to pay the loans with oil revenues.
Then the oil glut of 1981 dropped the price of oil by almost 20
percent.^

Meanwhile rising international interest rates increased the

cost of carrying the debt.

In August, 1982, Mexico announced that it was

unable to make its payments of over $3 billion for the coming q u a rter . ^
The United States, whose banks held about 60 percent of Mexico's
$80 billion debt,^~* stepped in with nearly $3 billion in aid to cover the
crisis.

It made $1 billion in oil purchase prepayments, another $1 bil
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lion, in agricultural credits, and put up half of a $1.85 billion short
term loan from the Bank for International Settlements.^

To avoid

offending Mexican sensibilities the aid was given as quietly as possible.
In November, 1982, the immediate crisis ended with a promise of Inter
national Monetary Fund support given on the condition that Mexico
implement an austerity program. ^
At the end of Lopez Portillo's term in office the United States and
Mexico had settled their differences over oil, at least for the moment.
Oil constituted an area of foreign dominance over Mexico's future at the
beginning of this century.

Mexico was perpetually concerned that the

United States might intervene militarily to protect the investments of
U. S. business in Mexico.

Following the successful expropriation of oil

lands, however, oil became a symbol of Mexico's independence and strength,
a role that it still plays today.

The discovery of new oil fields in the

midst of the energy crisis aided in establishing Mexico's economic
independence from the United States.

The growing trade in oil helps to

put Mexico on a more equal footing with the United States.

For the first

time since the beginning of World War II, Mexico seems of vital impor
tance to the United States.
Both countries decided on policies that would encourage the
gradual development of oil as a means of strengthening the Mexican
economy because both feared the inflationary impact that rapid oil
development would have on Mexico.

In contrast to the disruptions caused

by oil fifty years ago, oil relations today run smoothly.

The natural

gas controversy, however, was another matter, reminding the United States
to tread lightly when dealing with Mexico's patrimonio.
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As oil prices fell in the early 1980's and Mexico’s debt problems
deepened, it became apparent that U. S. - Mexican interdependence had
increased.

In accepting billions of dollars in aid from the United

States to repay its debt, Mexico may have added to its reliance on the
United States.

On the other hand, U. S. banks, holding nearly 60 per

cent of the debt, were certainly tied to. Mexico.

Add the fact that

Mexico is now the United States' largest supplier of foreign oil, and
it is obvious that the United States is more dependent on Mexico than
it was a decade ago.
As in the past, petroleum has the potential to inflame relations
between the United States and Mexico, but so far differences have been
settled amicably.

With the importance that Mexico's oil holds for its

economy and for the United States' energy supply, oil has pulled the
two nations closer together.
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IV.

IMMIGRATION

The immigration of undocumented Mexican workers to the United
States provides the most noticeable area of contact between the people
of the United States and Mexico.

The migration of Mexican laborers is

a result of economic conditions prevailing in the United States as
contrasted to those in Mexico.

The United States has traditionally

welcomed Mexican labor in periods of prosperity, and rejected it in
times of recession.

Mexico, on the other hand, seeks constant access

to the U. S. labor market in order to alleviate its unemployment
problems.

The situation creates continuing tension.

immigration policies are in direct opposition:

The two nations'

the United States

attempts, at times half-heartedly, to impose limits on Mexican entry
into the U. S., while Mexico believes its citizens should be allowed
access to U. S. jobs.

Background
Studies suggest that undocumented Mexican workers coming to the
United States are strongly motivated by economic reasons.

Over 84

percent of Mexican aliens interviewed in each of three separate studies
said they had gone to the United States in order to find a job or to
increase family income.
Mexican migration to the United States goes back at least 100
years, though it did not begin automatically with U. S. development of
58
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territories conquered in the Mexican War.

Originally, the United States

relied on Chinese labor to develop the West.

Mexican labor began to

arrive in the United States with the railroads built to deliver the
resources of Mexico's subsoil during the Porfirio Diaz government.

The

workers were hired to build railroads to San Antonio, El Paso, Saint
Louis, Santa Fe, San Francisco, Kansas City and Chicago.
By the early twentieth century, Mexican manpower was used in the
mines of Colorado and New Mexico, in the stockyards and steel mills of
Chicago, and on the newly-irrigated croplands of Texas and California.
The Mexican labor helped to lower U. S. production costs by exerting a
downward pressure on wages.
From the beginning, levels of national economic development, as
well as the play of supply and demand, have affected the migrant labor
market.

Then, as now, Mexico looked to the United States for

technology, capital, and employment while the United States looked to
Mexico for cheap raw materials, services, and labor.
In coming to the United States, Mexican migrants have always
responded more to economic conditions in Mexico than to conditions in
the United States, such as the U. S. unemployment level or the appre
hension level by the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS).
The immigrants are attracted to the United States by employment
opportunities.

In the late 1970's it was estimated that half of
O

Mexico's work force was either unemployed or underemployed.

In

addition, wages are much higher in the United States than in Mexico.
In one sample agricultural day laborers were paid $120 per week in the
U. S. compared to $9.20 per week in Mexico.^

Most rural Mexicans can
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earn and save more in one to three months in the U. S. than they could
in an entire year of labor in their home community.

A majority of

studies indicate that illegal aliens earn at or above the U. S.
minimum wage, though agricultural and domestic workers along the border
tend to earn lower wages than industrial workers in the interior.^
Historically, severe draught, floods or climactic conditions which
affect agriculture have lead to sharp increases in the rate of migration
to the United States.

One of the most basic causes of migration to the

United States is an excess of population relative to the amount of
cultivable land and the number of non-agricultural jobs.^

Nearly 80

percent of Mexican immigrants originate in impoverished rural communiO
ties, many of which have developed traditions of migrating to the U. S.
Even if Mexico's population were brought under control, migration
to the United States would continue as long as the wage differential
remains as large as it is today.

Though it is the lack of well-paid

jobs in Mexico which fuels migration, the importance of unemployment and
underemployment should not be underestimated.
Mexican immigrants coming to the United States are predominantly
young, male, and poorly educated, with five or fewer years of schooling.
Most are occupationally unskilled, having worked only in agricultural
jobs before entering the United States.

Many have worked only on family

farms, and are entering the wage-labor force for the first time.

About

70 percent of the Mexican workers are single when they enter the United
States for the first time.

Even after marriage, most leave their wives

and children at home to reduce the chance of being detected by U. S.
authorities and to avoid the high cost of supporting a family in the
Q
United States.
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It is estimated that there are between 3,5 and 6 million illegal
residents in the United States, but that Mexican nationals account for
less than half of the illegal/undocumented population.I®

Though there

are large numbers of undocumented Mexicans residing in the United States,
most Mexican workers do not remain in the U. S.

Studies indicate that

only 11 percent of Mexican illegals work in the United States for over
one year before returning to Mexico.

Thirty percent of Mexican illegals

return home when seasonal jobs end, and another 32 percent return to
Mexico when separation from their families becomes intolerable.

Given

the choice, 74 percent of undocumented Mexican workers would prefer living
in Mexico and working in the U. S. to moving to the United States. ^

United States Immigration Policy
Until 1965 the United States placed no limit on the number of legal
immigrants it would accept from Mexico and the other countries of the
Western

H e m i s p h e r e . - ^

However, by 1924 there were restrictions requiring

that immigrants pay an eight dollar head tax and purchase a ten dollar
visa.

The head tax and visa charges were too high for many Mexicans who

simply began crossing the border without paying the required fees.

This

was the beginning of illegal Mexican immigration to the United States.

13

From the beginning of this century through the 1920’s, Mexican
immigration increased rapidly.

In 1900 the U. S. census counted roughly

300,000 persons of Mexican ancestry;-^ by 1930 over 700,000 legal Mexican
immigrants, and perhaps over one million illegal Mexicans, had entered the
U. S.-'--’

The increase was partly a result of rapid economic development

in the American Southwest and partly a consequence of worsening conditions
in Mexico during the declining years of the Diaz dictatorship and the
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Revolution.

The U. S. demand for agricultural labor from 1900 to 1920

was so great that employers went to border towns to hire immigrants or
sent "help wanted" notices into the interior of Mexico.

Western mines,

railroads and construction projects also depended heavily on Mexican
labor.

Over 70 percent of railroad workers, for example, came from

Mexico.-*-6
During the financial boom of the twenties, most Americans were
indifferent to the immigration of Mexicans whether legal or illegal.
Though there was no great effort to change immigration patterns, the
Border Patrol was created in 1924 to police both the Canadian and Mexican
borders.

Then the Great Depression, beginning in 1929, created high

unemployment in the United States.

The government began a program to

reduce the number of workers competing for scarce jobs by repatriating
aliens— even those with proper documentation.

Over 500,000 Mexicans

returned home under pressure from both U. S. and Mexican officials.
Legal immigrants and U. S. - born relatives of illegal immigrants were
repatriated along with those who had entered illegally. ^
In 1942 the Bracero (day laborer) program was instituted to
control the flow of immigrants.

Both the Mexican and U. S. governments

had reason to regulate immigration.

Increasing Mexican nationalism and

past experience led Mexico to seek guarantees that its citizens would be
protected from prejudice, deportations, and discrimination.
workers had become a political issue in Mexico.

Abuse of

The government particu

larly wanted to keep migrants out of Texas where anti-Mexican views and
acts had a venemous history.
American employers welcomed the illegal workers but wanted a more
secure labor-supply system with legal Mexican immigrants.

In 1941
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farmers contended that without regularized, legal immigration from Mexico
some crops would go unharvested.

Railways and other employers also

wanted legal access to Mexican manpower.
To secure Mexico's agreement to the Bracero program, Washington
accepted the Mexican demand that the U. S. federal government act as the
employer.

The U. S. government therefore handled all business and

problems, including setting':the worker's wage rate and establishing
protective measures.

Texas was not allowed workers under the program,

but still received thousands of illegal Mexicans.
The Bracero program was originally intended as a means to fill war
time personnel shortages in the U. S., but was extended many times and
stayed in effect until the end of 1964.

Between four and five million

temporary workers were admitted from 1942 to the end of the program.
Supporters of the Bracero program on both sides of the border claimed that
it would fulfill the needs of U. S. employers for workers and, at the
same time, decrease the pressures for illegal immigration.

Instead, the

Bracero program actually encouraged illegal movement by attracting more
workers northward than could be legally accommodated.

In 1946 99,591

illegal aliens were apprehended in the United States; by 1952 the number
had increased to 528,815.-^
The Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952 included legislation
intended to discourage illegal immigration.

The willful importation,

transportation, or harboring of illegal aliens was made a felony punish
able by a $2,000 fine, or imprisonment, or both.

However, employers were

exempted from the penalties for harboring under what is now known as the
Texas Proviso.
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Once the new immigration law was in effect, the United States made
a major effort to enforce it and bring illegal immigration under control.
A program called "Operation Wetback" was begun to deport undocumented
workers in which the INS used paramilitary operations to sweep through
cities in search of aliens.

20

Over one million aliens were deported under

Operation Wetback, but complaints about "police state" methods from critics
in both the United States and Mexico led to its abandonment in 1955.

21

The Bracero program only succeeded in reducing immigration when
combined with a massive law enforcement effort, an effort which disregarded
the rights of many of those apprehended.

In addition, the agricultural

labor portion of the Bracero program had been increased to the point that
it depressed wages, making the jobs involved undesirable for domestic
workers.

The price of curbing illegal immigration through the combination

of Operation Wetback and the Bracero program was deemed too high.

Despite

the desire of the Mexican government to continue the Bracero program, it
was disbanded after 1964.^2
The termination of the Bracero program left only the H-2 provisions
of the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952 as a vehicle for the
admission of temporary alien workers.

The H-2 program is a limited pro

gram allowing temporary workers to enter the United States if the
Department of Labor certifies that U. S. workers are not available.
The Labor Department must also certify that the employment of aliens will
not adversely affect the wages and working conditions of similarly
employed U. S. workers.^3
Agricultural employers sought to continue the use of Mexican
workers under the H-2 provisions, but the Department of Labor precluded
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that option.
terminated.

From 1967 to 1977 the admission of Mexican workers was
Then in 1977 the INS overruled the Department of Labor to

admit Mexican nationals into western Texas for the onion and canteloupe
harvests.
The 1964 termination of the Bracero Agreement removed legal support
from historic population movements which were well institutionalized on
both sides of the border and encouraged by U. S. employers.

9c

To some

extent, illegal Mexican immigration since 1964 can be seen as an informal,
clandestine continuation of the Bracero program.

The numbers of immi

grants classified as illegal have also been increased by recent changes
in provisions for permanent immigration to the United States.
Since the 1920's, the U. S. immigration policy had been designed to
preserve the racial and ethnic status quo.

While immigration from the

Western Hemisphere had no ceiling, quotas were established for the
Eastern Hemisphere based on national origin.

o /:

The Immigration and

Nationality Act of 1952, which was passed over President Truman's veto,
preserved the national origins system.

Truman objected that, "Such a

concept is utterly unworthy of our traditions and ideals...'

97

From

1952 to 1965 every president worked toward the elimination of the
national origins quota system.

9 ft

In 1965 the Immigration and Nationality Act was amended to replace
the national origins provisions.

The new goals of U. S. immigration

policy gave family reunification top priority.

Preference was also

given to qualified immigrants in occupations beneficial to U. S.
9 0

economic and cultural interests.
For the first time, however, the Western Hemisphere was also
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subject to quotas.

Eariler policymakers bad seen immigration between the

United States and her Western Hemisphere neighbors as uncontrollable on
the one hand and as a sign of a good neighbor on the other.

In contrast,

the framers of the 1965 Act believed that the earlier policy was incon
sistent with the elimination of place of birth as a factor in immigration
policy since it conveyed a preferred status to Western Hemisphere born
immigrants.

The 1965 ammendments imposed a 120,000 annual numerical

ceiling on immigration from the Western Hemisphere effective July 1, 1968.
As in the Eastern Hemisphere, immidiate relatives of U. S. citizens
remained numerically exempt from the ceiling.

OA

Immigration from the

Eastern Hemisphere was subject to a 20,000 per-country limit with up to
170.000 visas distributed according to a seven-category preference system.
The 120,000 annual ceiling for the Western Hemisphere had no preference
system or per-country limit.

11

Under these provisions, Mexico became the major source of Western
Hemisphere immigrants, averaging 40,000 per year until 1976.

In 1976

the Immigration and Nationality Act was further amended to extend the
20.000 per-country limits to the Western Hemisphere as well as the
Eastern Hemisphere.

The act was intended to end ethnocentric policies

33

and put both hemispheres on an essentially equal immigration system based
on existing 170,000 and 120,000 ceilings.

The Congress seriously

considered increasing the per-country ceiling to 35,000 for contiguous
countries within the Western Hemisphere limit of 120,000.

However, it

decided there would be a problem of illegal immigration from Mexico
whether the ceiling was 35,000 or 20,000, and increasing the ceiling for
Canada and Mexico would only have increased demand throughout the rest of
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the hemisphere.

To avoid unequal treatment, the concept of a special

relationship was rejected.^
Since numerically limited immigration from Mexico had been running
around 40,000 per year prior to the time the 20,000 per-country limit took
effect on January 1, 1977, it was unavoidable that the new law reduced
Mexico's v i s a s . C u t t i n g Mexico's per-country limit in half created a
sudden bottleneck in legal immigration.

The new legislation thus rein

forced the process of illegal immigration.^

By the late 1970's the INS

guessed that up to 800,000 Mexican illegals entered the United States
07

each year.

There was widespread dissatisfaction among U. S. citizens

with an immigration policy that seemed to be out of control.^8
In 1977 Presidents Carter and Lopez-Portillo took a step toward
solving the problem by establishing a Consultative Mechanism to study
immigration and other unresolved U. S. - Mexican issues.

The Migration

Group of the Consultative Mechanism established a program of research
exchange, cooperation against smugglers of illegal immigrants, and joint
training of U. S. and Mexican immigration officials.

19

The United States Congress also attempted to deal with the immigra
tion problem.

After 1977 a number of bills were submitted to enforce the

immigration laws, but none passed.

The bills commonly provided penalties

for employers of illegal aliens and amnesty for workers already in the
United States.

Some bills also called for national identity cards.

Hispanic, civil rights, and business groups successfully opposed the
measures.^

When a proposal submitted by President Carter was also

rejected, Congress responded by creating the Select Commission for
Immigration and Refugee Policy in May, 1978.

The Commission evaluated
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the policies, laws, and processes regulating immigration to the United
States, and submitted recommendations for change to the President and
C ongress.^
Legislation pending in Congress as of 1984 would incorporate the
Select Commission’s proposals and provide the first wholesale revision of
U. S. immigration laws since 1952.

Known as the Simpson-Mazzoli bill,

the measure has passed both the House and Senate, and has been sent to a
conference committee to reconcile differences between the versions passed
by the two houses of Congress.
the same basic goals:

Both the House and Senate versions have

curbing the flow of illegal aliens into the

United States and granting legal amnesty to millions of aliens already in
the country.

Both bills provide penalties for employers who knowingly
/ O

hire illegal aliens.
Unofficial reaction in Mexico to the Simpson-Mazzoli bill has been
unfavorable.

If passed, the bill would make it harder for illegal

immigrants to find jobs in the United States.

Resentment is widespread

in Mexico, which depends on the U. S. to ease its unemployment and
underemployment.
The reaction of the Mexican press has been overwhelmingly hostile.
A columnist for the Mexico City daily El Universal wrote, "The insult
inflicted on us by the U. S. has wounded our national honor."

Other

critics in the press complain that Washington has forgotten how Mexican
labor came to the aid of U. S. agriculture during World War II, and
condemn U. S. refusal to ease trade restrictions while Mexico suffers its
most severe economic crisis since the Depression.

Opposition party

leaders predict increased social tensions in the northern and central
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Mexican states if the Simpson-Mazzoli bill leads to greater numbers of
Mexicans being deported.
Privately, some influential Mexicans are more philosophical about
the effects that the Simpson-Mazzoli bill would have.

A high-ranking

government official commented, "I don't think all of a sudden we will
have a large number of Mexicans returning and endangering the country.
In the Mexican family, where everyone lives in one room, one more won't
change the situation.

Mexican Immigration Policy
During General Porfirio Diaz's government, Mexico considered
emigration to have a positive value because returning workers brought
back new skills and techniques.

Later, toward the close of the 1920's,

Mexicans were becoming aware of the drawbacks associated with emigration,
but still regarded it as an "escape valve."

Emigration was considered a

solution rather than a problem.
This view changed during President Lazaro Cardenas' term in office.
Cardenas served from 1934 to 1940, during which time the United States was
repatriating workers to ease the domestic unemployment of the Depression.
The Mexican people's awareness of emigration issues bacame more acute as
the abuses, maltreatment and violence associated with the deportation of
large contingents of workers attracted attention.

Public opinion united

to demand that the Mexican government protest to the United States.
Meanwhile, Cardenas initiated a repatriation program to place the
deportees in agricultural and cattle raising communal centers.
During the administration of Manuel Avila Camacho from 1940 to 1946
the first of the Bracero agreements was signed; for the next 22 years
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they regulated emigration to the United States.

The Bracero programs

provided a partial solution to the emigration problem, but also generated
problems by attracting many Mexicans without proper papers to the United
States.

The Mexican government was put to the expense of creating a

department to control workers who did not stay within the established
quotas.

Mexico also had to assume responsibility for the selection,

hiring, board and lodging, and transport of bracero workers.

After the

final Bracero agreement was signed in 1951, the issue of migrant workers
was not discussed again by the United States and Mexico until the program
ended.^
When the Bracero program was dropped in 1964, Mexico was essentially
content to ignore the issue.

It limited diplomatic initiatives to calls

for greater protection of the rights of aliens while in the United States,
and made periodic efforts to secure a new contract labor agreement.

In

1974 President Luis Echeverria rejected the idea of a new Bracero program
on the grounds that it would only lead to increased exploitation of
Mexican workers in the United States.

Echeverria often complained of the

mistreatment of undocumented workers, blaming increased migration on the
widening inequalities between rich and poor nations.
When Lopez Portillo took office in 1976, the tone of Mexican policy
became more pragmatic, but the message was the same.

In his annual address

on September 1, 1977, he stated:
We would hope that Mexicans could realize their maximum
personal and social potential in our country.
Nevertheless,
several thousand Mexican workers in search of other horizons
cross our borders without the necessary documentation.
In
part, this movement is a result of our unemployment.
I
repeat that they are not delinquents; that the possible
violation of migration laws does not sanction the infringe
ment of labor laws, and even less of human rights.
Therefore
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we hope that the response to the workers is not police action
but measures based on understanding and courtesy among the
affected parties in order to resolve this common problem, which
is rooted in a very old relationship between us which is
unfavorable to us.
To correct it would remedy many ills. We
have tried our best to locate the causes and moderate the
effects of the problem. We state once more that we want to
export not labor but products.
Our being able to do so depends
on how well we understand the problem and how balanced a solu
tion we can find.
Lopez Portillo proposed trade concessions from the United States,
such as lower tariffs on Mexican shoes and agricultural products, as a
means of reducing the flow of illegal immigrants.46

He maintained that

the only way to alleviate the dire poverty and unemployment which drove
Mexicans to emigrate was by giving Mexico an equal chance on the world
markets and eliminating trade barriers.

He felt that the United States

should consider the causes as well as the control of immigration. ^
Since abandoning the bracero concept, Mexico has viewed the emigra
tion issue as a developemnt problem to be solved over the long term.

The

government is relying on broad national plans for industrialization to
ease unemployment, and with it the problem of undocumented migrant
workers.4®
Officially, undocumented emigration is a violation of Mexican
statute, but the government does little to end emigration beyond expressing
official disapproval.

The Mexican government does not feel compelled to

stop the emigration because the outflow of population is reversible and
the workers return to Mexico.

In addition, the emigration benefits

Mexico by serving as a social and economic safety valve.49

Emigration to

the United States helps to make up the difference between the 800,000
workers who enter Mexico’s job market annually and the 350,000 new jobs
created each year."^

Finally, migrant remittances of money saved and
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sent back to Mexico are probably in excess of $3 billion per year.

The

remittances are a crucial factor in the Mexican balance of payments,
accounting for more income than tourism.
Illegal emigration is a sensitive issue for Mexico in the sense
that the large volume of emigrants calls attention to the failure of
Mexico's development policies to create employment and raise income for a
large sector of the population. ^

Emigration is also a disadvantage in

that it siphons off valuable human capital— as much as 8 percent of the
Mexican population may be involved in the influx into the United States.
The issue has strong nationalistic overtones reinforced by isolated
but widely publicized cases of physical mistreatment of Mexican illegals
in the United States, and by the general awareness that the U. S.
historically has recruited Mexican labor in times of emergency and
officially shunned it in normal t i m e s . ^

Emigration also touches the

national pride by exposing the developmental disparities between the
United States and Mexico, casting Mexico in the role of dependent.
National dignity and sovereignty are at stake.
The problem of illegal immigration is a highly visible one.

The

presence of hundreds of thousands of undocumented Mexican workers in the
U. S. labor force leads to the public perception that aliens are taking
jobs away from U. S. citizens, depressing wages, arid putting a burden on
social programs.

Despite these charges, there is almost no concensus on

the impact that illegal immigration actually has on U. S. society.
Mexico highly publicized incidences of abuse and violence lead to the
perception that Mexican workers are routinely victimized by the United
States.

In
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The approaches that the United States and Mexico take in handling
the immigration problem are very different.

The United States has tried

to block the entry of illegals through legislation and border patrols.
This approach, if successful, would bring immediate results in the form
of lower immigration to the United States, but fails to address the root
of the problem.

Mexico, on the other hand, chooses to ignore the effect—

illegal emigration— and attempts to treat the cause— lack of adequate
employment.

However, even if the Mexican government achieves its employ

ment creation targets, it will take 286 years to wipe out the existing
backlog of unemployed and underemployed workers.

Ignoring emigration is

a feasible solution for Mexico which needs the "safety valve" provided by
employment in the United States.
Though of long standing, the immigration problem is relatively low
key and does not damage official relations between the United States and
Mexico.

Immigration problems, however, tend to deepen resentments among

both U. S. and Mexican citizens.

In that sense, immigration has a

negative impact on the way the two peoples view each other.
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V.

CONCLUSION

Relations between the United States and Mexico remain friendly in
spite of persistent problems.

Economic ties are basic to U. S. - Mexican

relations; the nations are bound together by trade and immigration,
encouraged by geography.

Because immigration and trade, especially oil

trade, are the areas of greatest contact, they are also the most constant
sources of conflict.
Relations today are sometimes made more difficult by resentments
carried over from the past.
Mexican history:

Two themes have run throughout U. S. -

the United States has always dominated Mexico, and

conversely, Mexico has been of secondary importance to the United States.
Mexico is acutely aware of U. S. dominance and struggles to escape it.
Chapter I reviewed U. S. - Mexican history to demonstrate the theme
of U. S. dominance and Mexico's resentment of U. S. influence.

It also

showed how 19th century suspicions and hostilities have given way to the
cordial relations existing since the 1940's.
In the beginning U. S. domination of Mexico was territorial in
nature.

From the time of its independence in 1821, Mexico harbored

suspicions about the expansionist tendencies of the American people who
at that time were toying with the idea of pushing the U. S. boundary
south to the Rio Grande.

Such a move would have contravened the 1821

Spanish treaty which named the Sabine as the southern border.
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In spite
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of doubts, Mexico decided to allow U. S. citizens to settle Texas.

The

Texans soon rebelled against Mexico, and eventually Texas was annexed by
the United States.
Shortly after annexation, the United States provoked Mexico into a
war over the western boundary of Texas.

The war ended with the United

States gaining the Mexican territories of Texas, California, and New
Mexico.

The Texas Revolution and the Mexican War produced long-lasting

distrust and hostility between the United States and Mexico.
Relations improved briefly under Presidents Lincoln and Juarez as
the United States refused to recognize the Empire that France imposed on
Mexico.

Under Juarez's successor, Porfirio Diaz, however, the two nations

nearly went to war over border violations.

Tensions subsided when Diaz

finally ordered additional troops to guard the frontier.

For the remain

der of the Diaz era, relations, spurred by growing economic ties,
continued to improve.
Diaz encouraged U. S. and British investment in order to build a
modern economy for Mexico.

Though official relations with the United

States improved steadily, the Mexican people objected to foreign "coloni
zation.”

It was during the Diaz era that U. S. domination of Mexico was

extended to economic matters.
Economics was not the only area of U. S. influence, however.

The

United States intervened in the Mexican Revolution several times, most
notably at Veracruz.

The U. S. occupation of Veracruz resulted in the

deaths of over 300 Mexicans, and contributed to the resignation of
General Huerta.

After Huerta resigned, the United States recognized

General Carranza's faction, ignoring the claims of Pancho Villa.

Villa
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retaliated by killing 33 U. S. citizens in border raids.

Once again war

threatened, but U. S. attention turned to World War I; affairs in Mexico
took a backseat to problems in Europe.

The events of the Revolution left

a legacy of bitterness that still arouses Mexican resentment toward the
United States.
After the Revolution, U. S. concerns with Mexico again focused on
economic issues.

Worried by provisions in the Mexican Constitution that

gave the state ownership of subsoil properties, the United States for
three years refused to recognize Alvaro Obregon's government.

The U. S.

finally recognized Obregon after the question of oil property rights was
settled to its satisfaction at the Bucareli Conference in 1923.

At the

Conference Mexico agreed not to seize oil lands if a "positive act" to
drill oil had been taken prior to May 1, 1917.
A year later U. S.

- Mexican relations were strained almost to the

breaking point when Mexico ordered the oil companies to exchange their
property titles for leases.

The controversy was settled by the Mexican

Courts at the suggestion of U. S. Ambassador Dwight Morrow.

The United

States acknowledged the court settlement, and issued a release that future
policies would also be determined by Mexico.

The United States had

finally recognized full Mexican sovereignty where U. S. interests were
involved.
The question of oil surfaced again in 1938 when Mexico nationalized
the oil companies.

The governments of the United States and Mexico

remained stalemated over

the oil expropriation until the approach of

World War II hastened an

agreement settling the claims. After World War II,

each country turned its attention elsewhere.
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For over a century from 1821 to 1938 U. S. - Mexican relations were
marked by hostility and suspicion.

Even the improvements in economic

relations during the Diaz era led. to serious strains later when Mexico
reasserted its authority over oil properties.

Tensions did not finally

relax until Franklin Roosevelt's Good Neighbor Policy and the 1941 General
Agreement to settle the oil expropriation dispute.
Since the 1940's U. S. - Mexican relations have been generally
friendly.

The Chamizal boundary dispute and Colorado River salinity

controversy were settled.

Cooperative programs were established to handle

a number of problems including narcotics control, water pollution, and
artifact smuggling.
By the early 1970's, however, the friendship was showing signs of
strain.

Misunderstandings over the U. S. vote on the Charter of Economic

Rights and Duties, immigration, and natural gas pricing, as well as
differences over Central American policy gave the appearance that relations
had deteriorated.

In an article titled, "A Mexican Perspective," Olga

Pellicer de Brody observed that a series of irritating situations had
ruined the "climate of cordiality" existing from 1942 to 1970.

The

article cited the Ixtoc I oil spill, the natural gas controversy, migrant
worker disputes, oil export levels and trade liberalization as contributing
factors. •*Though differences with Mexico in the past few years seem sharp,
they are only part of the normal ups and downs experienced by the United
States and Mexico during the postwar era.

Of the problems cited by Olga

Pellicer de Brody, the oil spill and the gas controversy have already
been settled.

It is true that trade, energy and immigration issues are
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constant irritants.

However, problems are always under discussion through

the Consultative Mechanism, if not through state visits.

Since the 1940Ts

the United States and Mexico have settled their differences amicably.
The constant appearance of deteriorating relations arises from the
long-term nature of the problems facing the two countries.

Problems with

trade, pollution, immigration and energy recur over time.

Solutions are

never final, yet the United States and Mexico continue to cooperate ..in
settling differneces.
Chapters II, III, and IV illustrate the importance of economics to
the U. S. - Mexican relationship.

The topics covered— trade, oil, and

immigration— are the most prominent issues confronting the United States
and Mexico.

Each of these issues is based on economics.

Chapters II, III,

and IV also show that Mexico depends on the United States in terms of trade
and immigration much more than the U. S. depends on Mexico.

The chapters

bear out the conclusion that while the United States dominates Mexico,
Mexico is of secondary importance to the U. S.

Oil is the exception to

this rule.
Trade provides the contacts through which the people of the United
States and Mexico deal with one another.

Mexico is one of the United

States' largest trading partners, but the United States is Mexico's
largest trade partner.

Although the United States dominates Mexico's

foreign trade, the reverse is not true.

The composition of Mexico's

imports from the United States also contributes to dependence because
Mexico relies on the U. S. for many of the capital goods necessary to
sustain its development.

The United States, in contrast, purchases mostly

raw materials and food from Mexico.

While Mexico is the United States'
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principal supplier of foreign oil, Mexican oil represents only 5 percent
of U. S. consumption.

Nonetheless, Mexico's trade is important to the

United States.
The stated objectives of U. S. foreign policy regarding Mexico in
clude the development of a modern Mexican economy, a mutually beneficial
system of trade and investment, and encouragement of U. S. private invest
ment in the form needed to promote Mexico's growth.

These objectives

reveal the importance that the United States places on economic ties with
Mexico.
Immigration is another area of relations which rests on economic
influences.

The immigrant movement is the result of inadequate employment

opportunities in Mexico compared to opportunities available in the United
States.

Though U. S. employers depend on Mexico for inexpensive labor,

Mexico's dependence on immigration as a means of alleviating widespread
underemployment and unemployment is more obvious.
Oil is one area in which Mexico is not dependent on the United States,
although the U. S. does purchase about 80 percent of Mexico's oil exports.
In the mid-seventies the size of Mexico's oil deposits focused U. S.
attention on Mexico.

For the first time since World War II, affairs with

Mexico seemed vitally important to the United States.

Even with regard to

oil, however, Mexico is not entirely free of U. S. influence.

When Mexico

borrowed too heavily against its oil revenues, the United States, whose
banks held about 60 percent of Mexican debts, stepped in with $3 billion
in aid to cover the crisis.

In the area of oil trade, the U. S. - Mexican

relationship is more interdependent than U. S. dominated.
Mexico's oil discoveries have helped to give it a more important,
more equal status in relation to the United States.

Oil, however, is not
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enough to offset the overall imbalance in the relationship.

Mexico will

remain economically dependent on the United States.
As Chapter I showed, Mexicans resent the influence that foreign
powers, especially the United States, have had over their nation.
Chapters II, III, and IV outline the ways in which this resentment affects
policy today.
Reacting to the "economic invasion” of the Diaz era, Mexico passed
laws limiting foreign investment.

Foreign companies operating in Mexico

must consider themselves as Mexican nationals and seek no special
protection from their own governments.

The petroleum and forest industries

are entirely off-limits to foreign participation; they are solely Mexican
owned.

The mining industry, and all new investments after 1973, require

majority Mexican participation except where the requirement is waived.
The decision not to join GATT also reflected Mexico's desire to maintain
trading and investment independence.
Reaction to foreign control was especially strong in the petroleum
industry which was nationalized in 1938.

Nationalization was an enor

mously popular move seen as a reassertion of Mexican sovereignty over
foreign companies.

More recently, the Mexican government's construction

of a gas pipeline to Texas revived nationalist fears of domination by
U. S. oil interests.

Subsequent U. S. rejection of gas purchases caused

major disillusionment with the United States.

Later, when the U. S.

arranged an aid package to help Mexico over its debt crisis, the situation
was handled quietly to avoid offending Mexican sensitivities once again.
Immigration does not have such a volatile history.

U. S. policies

tend to be guided by whatever is the current state of the economy.

In

84
times of recession the reaction is to clamp down on illegal immigration;
at other times enforcement is more relaxed.

Mexico believes that by

accepting its workers during times of emergency or prosperity and later
rejecting them, the United States insults its national honor.

This

attitude shows in Mexico's failure to enforce its laws against illegal
emigrat ion.
Aside from past differences, the United States and Mexico are faced
with a steady stream of disagreements in areas that currently concern
them.

Chapters II, III, and IV examined policies and goals relating to

the most important issues in U. S. - Mexican relations today.
In the area of trade, the United States and Mexico are in harmony
in their desire to promote a modern Mexican economy and mutually benefi
cial trade.

Ideas of what is "mutually beneficial" do not. always coincide.

In addition, their methods of attaining a modern economy differ.

The

United States wishes to encourage distribution of trade and investment
through free market forces, and would like to eliminate nontariff barriers
and export subsidies.

It believes that these goals can best be achieved

through membership in GATT.

Mexico rejected GATT, and protects its

national industries through such nontariff barriers as import licenses.
U'. S. and Mexican oil policies with regard to Mexico's oil are
more compatible.

To begin with Mexico had planned a slow, steady

development of its oil resources to avoid excessive inflation.
United States endorsed this policy.

The

When Mexico moved ahead too quickly

with its development plans and its oil revenues failed to cover its debts,
the United States extended aid.

Mexico is attempting to diversify its

oil sales so that it does not rely on the United States as an export
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market.

Officially, the U. S. bows to this decision.

The government has

stated that decisions on production and export levels should be made by
Mexico with no U. S. pressure for increases.

The United States does not

want to arouse Mexican antagonisms by pursuing an aggressive policy towards
Mexican oil.
Perhaps the most obvious policy differences between the United States
and Mexico occur in the area of immigration.

Emigration without proper

documentation is officially illegal under Mexican law.

In practice,

however, the Mexican government allows undocumented emigration.

Since

adopting the 20,000 per year ceiling on numerically limited immigration
from Mexico, U. S. policy has been at odds with the Mexican view that
undocumented emigrants "are not delinquents."

While the U. S. attempts

to limit immigration through ceilings on legal entry, Mexico suggests
trade concessions and development plans to reduce the need for immigration.
Despite marked differences in policy, Mexican officials acknowledge the
necessity of U. S. attempts to control its borders.
U. S. - Mexican disputes over conflicting policies attract a great
deal of attention and often cause alarm.
settled and forgotten quickly.

Certain types of issues can be

Boundary problems such as pollution and

smuggling fall into this category.

In other areas such as foreign policy,

the two countries basically agree to disagree.
It is the bedrock economic issues that cause trouble again and again.
It is also the bedrock economic issues that bring the United States and
Mexico together again and again.

It is in each nation's interest to

continue its trade with the other.

The congruity of national interests

is reflected in the fact that both nations are working, in their
different ways, toward one end:

a stable and prosperous Mexico.
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The United States and Mexico wish to promote trade to establish a
healthy Mexican economy which would benefit Both nations.

Separate

interests and past- differences may upset relations temporarily, but U. S. Mexican relations have a firm foundation in mutual economic interests.
The friendship will withstand many storms.
In 1967 Mexico's president, Gustavo Diaz Ordaz, put it this way:
"Geography has made us neighbors; economy has kept us the best of clients;
and the decided will of our peoples, overcoming at times the relentless
O

course of history, has made us cordial and respectful friends.”

Footnotes

^Susan Kaufman Purcell, ed., "Mexico-United States Relations,"
Proceedings of the Academy of Political Science 34 (1981):7-8.
^U.S., "Congress, House, Committee on the Judiciary, Hearings Before
the Subcommittee on Immigration, Refugees, and International Law of the
Committee on the Judiciary, 97th Congress, 1st Session, 1981, p. 356.
■^"Address by President Diaz Ordaz Before the Congress, October 27,"
Department of State Bulletin, November 20, 1967, p. 677.

87

BIBLIOGRAPHY

"Address by President Diaz Ordaz Before the Congress, October 27."
Department of State Bulletin, November 20, 1967, p. 677.
Bagley, Bruce.
Power?."

"Mexican Foreign Policy:
The Decline of a Regional
Current History, December, 1983, pp. 406-409.

Bath, C. Richard.
"Mexico, the United States and Selected Law of the Sea
Issues."
Inter-American Economic Affairs 35 (Summer 1981):3-24.
Bullard, Fredda
Jean.
Mexico’s Natural Gas.
Texas at Austin, 1968.

Austin:

The University of

Bustamente, Jorge A. and Geronimo G. Martinez.
"Undocumented Immigration
from Mexico: Beyond Borders but Within Systems." Journal of
International Affairs 33 (Spring/Summer 1979) -.265-284.
Callahan, James Morton.
American Foreign Policy in Mexican Relations.
New York:
The MacMillan Company, 1932.
Calvert, Peter. Mexico:
Publishers, 1973.

Nation of the Modern World. New York:

Cline, Howard F. The United States and Mexico.
Harvard University Press, 1963.

Praeger

Cambridge, Massachusetts:

Cohodas, Nadine.
"House Passes Immigration
Bill by Five Votes."
Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report, June 23, 1984, p. 1493.
Davis, Harold Eugene, and Larman C. Wilson.
Latin American Foreign
Policies. Baltimore:
The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1975.
"Debtor's Prism."

The Economist, September 11, 1982, p.

DeMott, John S. "Mexico Tightens Its Belt."
pp. 48-50.
"Feature."

13.

Time,June 13, 1983,

Department of State Bulletin, July, 1981, pp. 4-7.

Flores, Paul S. "Basic Data on the Economy of Mexico."
Reports, December, 1970, pp. 5-23.

Overseas Business

Foreign Economic Trends. Prepared by the U. S. Foreign Service, U.S.
Department of State, released by U.S. Department of Commerce,
January, 1980.

88

89
"How Long Can Bankers Pull Rabbits Out of a Sombrero?."
August 28, 1982, p. 59.
"Immigration Reform Measure Dies in House."
Almanac, 1982.

The Economist,

Congressional Quarterly

Kinzer, Stephen.
"Montezuma's Real Revenge."
1979, pp. 19-21.

The New Republic, March 3,

Krueger, Robert.
"U.S. - Mexican Relations."
tin, September, 1980.

Department of State Bulle

"Let Them Burn Tomatoes."

The Economist, July 21-27, 1979, p. 38.

Levin, Bob.
"Reagan's Mexican Overture."
pp. 36-37.

Newsweek, January 12, 1981,

McBride, Robert H . , ed. Mexico and the United States.
New Jersey:
Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1981.
Meisler, Stanley.
"Reacting to Big-Stick Diplomacy."
1976, pp. 142-145.
"Mexico: A Major Market for UTS. Products."
1980, pp. 3-7.

Englewood Cliffs,

Nation, February 7,

Business America, June 16,

"Mexico."

Department of State Background Notes,April, 1979, pp. 1-8.

"Mexico."

Department of State Background Notes,June, 1983, pp. 4-6.

"Mexico:
Ich Bin Ein Mexikaner."
November 3, 1978, p. 341.

Latin America Political Report,

"Mexico: Japanese Lead Scramble to Offer Trade and Investment for Oil."
Latin America Weekly Report, January 9, 1981, p. 4.
"Mexico."

Latin American Report, June, 1975, p. 6.

"Mexico."

Latin American Report, May, 1976, pp. 5-6.

"Mexico: Lopez Portillo Makes His Self-Criticism."
Report, September 4, 1981, p. 2.
"Mexico:
Reagan Decides on Low-Key Approach."
Report, May 22, 1981, p. 3.

Latin America Weekly

Latin America Weekly

"Mexico Reassesses Policy Towards Central America and Caribbean."
America Weekly Report, February 13, 1981, p. 1.
"Mexico:
The Old Guard."
1977, p. 42.,

Latin

Latin America Political Report, February 11,

90
Meyer, Lorenzo.
Mexico and the United States in the Oil Controversy,
1917-1942. Austin:
University of Texas Press, 1977.
Meyer, Michael C., and William L. Sherman.
The Course of Mexican History.
New York: Oxford University Press, 1979.
Mumme, Stephen P.
"Mexican Politics and the Prospects for Emigration
Policy: A Policy Perspective." Inter-American Economic Affairs 32
(Summer 1978):67-94.
New York Times, 1977.
New York Times, 1979.
Palmer, Jay.

"The Debt Bomb Threat."

"President Carter's Visit to Mexico."
March, 1979, pp. 53-63.

Time, January 10, 1983, pp. 42-51.
Department of State Bulletin,

Preston, Julia.
"Who Gets the Petropesos?."
pp. 139-142.

Nation, February 10, 1979,

Purcell, Susan Kaufman.
"Mexico - U.S. Relations: Big Initiatives Can
Cause Big Problems." Foreign Affairs 80 (Winter 1981-82):379-392.
Purcell, Susan Kaufman, ed.
"Mexico -.United States Relations."
Proceedings of the Academy of Political Science 34 (1981).
Rippy, J. Fred. Joel R. Poinsett, Versatile American.
Press, Publishers, 1968.
Sancton, Thomas A.
1982, p. 34.

New York:

"Frightening Specter of Bankruptcy."

Greenwood

Time, August 30,

Shafer, Robert James and Donald Mabry.
Neighbors— Mexico and the United
States, Wetbacks and Oil. Chicago: Nelson-Hall, 1981.
Smith, Jettison.
"Uncle Sam Over the Oil Barrel."
February 16, 1979, pp. 224-226.

National Review,

Story, Dale.
"Trade Politics in the Third World:
A Case Study of the
Mexican GATT Decision." International Organization 36 (Autumn 1982):
767-794.
"Toast by Secretary Kissinger, Mexico City, June 11."
Bulletin, July 5, 1976, p. 33.
Tower, Frederick.
"Marketing in
May, 1981, p. 16.

Department of State

Mexico." Overseas Business

Reports,

Truett, Dale B. and Lila Flory Truett.
"Mexico and GSP: Problems and
Prospects." Inter-American Economic Affairs 34 (Autumn 1980):67-85.

91
"United States Trade with Major Trading Partners 1974-1980."
Business Reports, November, 1982, p. 3.

Overseas

U.S. Community Services Administration, Latin American Institute, Univer
sity of New Mexico.
The Problem of the Undocumented Worker.
Edited by Robert S. Landmann.
(November 28, 1979, deposited).
U.S. Congress.
House.
Committee on Appropriations.
Department of the
Interior and Related Agencies Appropriations for 1980. Hearings
Before a Subcommittee of the Committee on Appropriations.
Subcom
mittee on the Department of the Interior and Related Agencies.
96th Congress, 1st Session, 1979.
_____________ . Departments of State, Justice, and Commerce, the Judiciary,
and Related Agencies Appropriations for 1979. Hearings Before A
Subcommittee of the Committee on Appropriations. 95th Congress,
2nd Session, 1978.
U.S.

Congress.
House. Committee on Science and Technology.
U.S. - Mexi
co Relations and Potentials Regarding Energy, Immigration, Scientif
ic Cooperation and Technology Transfer.
Report Prepared by Subcommittee on Investigations and Oversight and the Subcommittee on
Science, Research and Technology of the Committee on Science and
Technology. 96th Congress, 1st Session, 1979.

U.S.

Congress. House. Com m ittee on the Judiciary.
Hearings Before
Subcommittee on Immigration, Refugees, and International Law of the
Committee on the Judiciary. 97th Congress, 1st Session, 1981.

U.S. Congress.
House and Senate.
Committees on the Judiciary. U.S.
Immigration Policy and the National Interest. 97th Congress, 1st
Session, 1981.
U.S. Congress.
Joint Economic Committee.
Recent Developments in Mexico
and Their Economic Implications for the United States. Hearings
Before the Subcommittee on Inter-American Economic Relationships.
95th Congress, 1st Session, 1977.
_____________. The U.S. Role In a Changing World Political Economy:
Major Issues for the 96th Congress.
A Compendium of Papers
Submitted to the Joint Economic Committee. 96th Congress, 1st
Session, 1979.
U.S. Congress.
Senate.
Committee on Finance.
North American Economic
Interdependence.
Hearing Before the Subcommittee of International
Trade of the Committee on Finance. 96th Congress, 1st Session,
1979.
U.S. Congress.
Senate Committee on Foreign Relations and Joint Economic
Committee. Mexico's Oil and Gas Policy;
An Analysis. 95th
Congress, 2nd Session, 1979.

92
U.S. Congress.
Senate.
Committee on the Judiciary.
Selected Readings
on U.S. Immigration Policy and Law.
A Compendium Prepared at the
Request of Senator Edward M. Kennedy, Chairman, for the Use of The
Select Commission on Immigration and Refugee Policy. 96th Congress,
2nd Session, 1980.
U.S. Department of Commerce.
Bureau of the Census.
Area by Commodity Groupings Annual 1980.

U.S. Exports World

U.S. General Imports World Area by Commodity Groupings
Annual 1980.
U.S. Department of Commerce.
Office of Trade and Investment Analysis.
Trade Information and Analysis.
International Trade Administration.
"United States Foreign Trade Annual 1975-1981." Overseas Business
Reports, July, 1983.
U.S. President.
26th Annual Report of the President of the United States
on the Trade Agreements Program 1981-1982. Transmitted to Congress
November, 1982.
"U.S. Trade and Foreign Policy."
1981, pp. 47-48.

Department of State Bulletin, December,

U.S. Select Commission on Immigration and Refugee Policy.
U.S. Immigra
tion Policy and the National Interest: Appendix F to the Staff
Report of the Select Commission on Immigration and Refugee Policy;
Papers on Temporary Workers.
_____________ . U.S. Immigration Policy and the National Interest:
Staff
Report of the Select Commission on Immigration and Refugee Policy.
April 30, 1981.
_____________ . U.S. Immigration Policy and the National Interest:
The
Final Report of the Select Commission on Immigration and Refugee
Policy. Inarch 1, 1981.
The Vice President: Visit to Canada and Mexico."
Bulletin, March, 1978, pp. 9-13.

Department of State

Weil, Thomas E., Jan Knippers Black, Howard I. Blutstein, Kathryn Therese
Johnston, David S. McMorris.
Area Handbook for Mexico. (DA Pam
550-79).
Washington, D.C.: Foreign Area Studies of the American
University, 1975.
"Wounded Honor."

Time, July 9, 1984, p. 58.

